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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

LESSONS FROM THE 1999 ROUND OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

by

Kevin A. Lash

December 2003

Thesis Co-Advisors:

Donald Abenheim
Robert E. Looney

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LESSONS FROM THE 1999 ROUND OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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ABSTRACT

In the spring of 1999, The Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary all entered the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). These were the first former Warsaw Pact members to gain NATO accession since the Cold War ended with the dismemberment of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact between 1989 and 1991. Now, seven more states are near the end of their accession talks. Barring unforeseen events, all are expected to join the alliance in 2004.

This thesis studies the 1999 round of NATO accessants, particularly in the short time period since they achieved membership, and garners lessons for the new round of NATO candidates. It notes other significant events that led to NATO's enlargement, including NATO's post-Cold War transformation and the war in the Balkans along with courageous leadership.

The thesis summarizes common themes, identifies differences, and suggests solutions that could be implemented for the next round of NATO entrants, as well as for NATO as a whole, based on the three cases studied. It makes policy recommendations where appropriate.

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I. INTRODUCTION

We have a window of opportunity in which to recast the foundation of this Alliance. If we get it right, NATO will last for another fifty years. And we will have succeeded just like the founding fathers of NATO did. If we don't, the U.S. and Europe are likely to drift apart and the Alliance will atrophy.¹

Madeleine Albright, 1997

During the November 2002 Prague Summit, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) invited seven aspiring countries – Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia -- to begin accession talks to become a member of the alliance. All of these states are moving swiftly to achieve the requirements necessary for membership. Barring unforeseen events, all of these countries are expected to gain full membership in May of 2004. These new independent states of Europe represent the second round of recent NATO enlargement, following the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland who entered NATO in 1999. These two groups of countries are the first countries to join NATO since the end of the Cold War era. Less than fifteen years ago, most of these countries did not exist in their present form. Some, like Latvia, Slovakia, and Estonia, were parts of a sinking communist empire. Others, like Hungary, Poland and Romania, were former communist countries tethered to the now disbanded Soviet Union through the now defunct Warsaw Pact. As outlined by the demands of the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), each country was required to transform itself, both politically and economically as well as militarily, to be considered for membership in the transatlantic alliance. While they all should be commended for having accomplished this to the extent necessary, none of them will receive a perfect score for fully meeting all the criteria. In truth, neither the 1999 accessants, nor the 2004 aspirants have entirely accomplished all of the criteria of the MAP.

¹ Ronald D. Asmus, "Opening NATO's Door", (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 178.

A. PURPOSE

This thesis will look at the integration of the 1999 NATO accessants and attempt to draw useful insights to benefit the 2004 aspirants states that will soon be integrating into NATO as members. It will make policy recommendations to benefit both the aspirants as well as NATO where conclusions can be drawn. At this point in time, the relevant questions about most of the 2004 aspirant states requesting NATO membership are not about the NATO accession process. Barring any unexpected circumstances, the accession of the 2004 aspirants is practically assured. The questions that need to be asked now are how will their integration into NATO likely go? What can the second round entrants learn from the first round entrants? What will be the easy parts of integrating fully into the alliance? What will be the hard parts and what can be done to mitigate problem areas? Are there ways to support these countries on the road to integration? Is it likely that the new entrants will continue the integration process, or will some backslide from their commitments?

The implications of any study that can identify effective ways to help improve the NATO enlargement and integration process are profound. NATO's transforming roles include missions for which the forces of many of its longstanding members remain somewhat unprepared. The accession of new members extends the NATO commitments and transformation challenges even further. The democratic institutions of both the 1999 accessants as well as the 2004 aspirants are all less than fifteen years old and still maturing. Integration is proving to be more of a challenge for them than some initially thought.

There are several audiences that might benefit from this thesis. First, defense representatives and policymakers from the second round entrant countries would be interested in answers to these questions. Second, members and administrators within the NATO alliance itself should also be interested. In spite of the short timeframe, the members joining in 1999 have already been criticized and there have been calls for a mechanism to remove members that enjoy the security NATO offers without living up to responsibilities the alliance requires.² Third, the insights here may be of use to defense officials from NATO member states including the United States. Lastly, the membership

² Thomas S. Szayna, "NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping," 2001, 14. Available from internet site <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1234/> [accessed 7/17/2003]

support community that helps these states achieve NATO membership as well as to support integration may also find the findings useful. One such support organization is the National Guard's State Partnership Program (SPP). Because this program is not widely publicized and its existence is missing from most of the literature about NATO enlargement, we will provide a brief introduction here, which should provide insight regarding how the findings of this thesis might support the objectives of the SPP.

B. INTRODUCTION TO THE STATE SPONSORSHIP PROGRAM (SPP)

The National Guard's State Sponsorship Program (SPP) has provided a significant support structure to help new independent states achieve their goal of NATO membership. In spite of this, the program has kept a very 'low profile' and is practically unknown to the public and policymakers alike. However, the SPP dovetails perfectly into the MAP to help countries meet the many military, political, and economic requirements of membership. The SPP is a Department of Defense sponsored program that links a U.S. state's National Guard Military Department with the defense establishment of a developing country in an effort to provide support.³ Without exception, the request by the new independent states of Europe for an SPP host was to support their goal to become NATO members. By coordinating events and activities with the host nation, the National Guard has facilitated training and interactions needed to meet the requirements of NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP).

The initial purpose of the SPP was to support the numerous new independent nations by using the various state National Guard organizations. Coordination for the SPP is provided jointly by both the United States European Command (EUCOM) as well as the National Guard Bureau in Washington, D.C. Since it was launched in 1993, the tremendous growth of the SPP is an indicator of its success. It has been a driver to help the new independent states achieve their security goals in addition to helping to democratize the Central and Eastern European theater. Over the last decade, the program has matured and grown well beyond Europe and is now active on a worldwide basis. Currently, there are 39 U.S. states that are assigned to assist developing nations through the SPP on all parts of the globe with additional programs coming on-line. Very soon, it

³ Fleming, Michael, "The State to State Partnership Program." *NATO Review: WebEdition*, No. 3 – May-June 1997, Vol. 45, pp. 22-23. On-line at: <http://www.nato.int/doc/review/1997/9703-6.htm>. Accessed 1 May 2003.

is expected that the demand for the SPP will outstrip the capacity of the fifty-four National Guard Headquarters in the states and territories.⁴

The SPP has continued to evolve and has developed objectives for the purpose of insuring NATO accession and integration, as well as helping to achieve other strategic objectives around the world. The stated objectives for the European theater (i.e. EUCOM) are:

- Demonstrate military subordination to civilian authority.
- Demonstrate military support to civilian authorities.
- Assist in the development of democratic institutions.
- Foster open market economies to help bring stability.
- Project and represent U.S. humanitarian values.

A wide range of activities that often involve combinations of civil, military, and economic events support these objectives.⁵

While it should be noted that the SPP was not established as a NATO program, its consistency with the MAP as well as the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) programs is striking.⁶ NATO encourages allies to develop activities “in the Spirit of PfP.” The PfP offers partners increased opportunities to get acquainted with the militaries, governments and educational processes of the members states. The National Guard SPP is among the most successful of these.⁷ Partnerships with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are continuing, and each of the other seven states expected to gain membership in 2004 have long-standing, mature state partnerships established as well.

⁴ Presentation by Lt Gen Gary Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau given at the 2003 SPP Planning Workshop, June 24, 2003, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.

⁵ John Groves, Jr., “PfP and the State Partnership Program: Fostering Engagement and Progress,” *Parameters magazine on-line*, Spring 1999, pp. 43-53, available at: <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/99spring/groves.htm>. Accessed 3 May 2003].

⁶ The NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program was launched in January of 1994 and is a military cooperation program that provides a way for countries that are not NATO members to maintain a strong level of association and cooperation for membership. Some of the newly independent countries of Europe see it as a first step towards their long-term goal of NATO membership.

⁷ Fleming, Michael, “The State to State Partnership Program.” *NATO Review: WebEdition*, No. 3, May-June 1997, Vol. 45, 22.

C. FROM THE WARSAW PACT TO NATO ENLARGEMENT

The reform of security and defense in the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, as well as the seven 2004 NATO candidates arose from the collapse of the Warsaw Pact defense system as well as the Soviet style civil-military relations system, taking place in its entirety from 1989 to 1991. This event was sudden and unanticipated in regards to its timing, and will continue to cataclysmically alter all history and the lives of billions for the foreseeable future. This analysis will attempt to proceed, however, from recalling the shape and character of this process.

A brief historical understanding of the Warsaw Pact system of control of militaries under their influence allows a better understanding of the distance Central European militaries must travel in order to integrate with the West. The armies of Central Europe were re-organized after the Second World War and into the 1950s to be integrated within their so-called “military inner structure,” sometimes called “armies of the socialist type.” In practice, to insure control after the cold war, this reform meant a dual system of command and control (i.e. adaptation of the Trotskyite model) that placed a member of the main political administration (i.e. a *Politrak*) of the armed forces serving alongside a line commander, who was also required to make a career in the party. This system was further reinforced by secret service cadres within the ranks as well as Soviet advisors being placed at the corps level of command.⁸

In its international dimension, the Warsaw Pact -- including Prague, Warsaw and Budapest -- did have ministries of defense and general staffs of a kind. But functionally, they were almost powerless. All significant operational and strategic decision-making were handled by the united Warsaw Pact command headquarters, which existed under direct Soviet tutelage. All senior officers had been schooled by the Soviets in policy and doctrine at Soviet general staff academies.⁹ Warsaw Pact forces were deeply integrated within the Soviet system. This is in direct contrast to NATO’s system, where a diversity

⁸ Much of this general historical narrative can be found in an unpublished narrative written and provided to the author by Professor Donald Abenheim, National Strategic Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, October 21, 2003.

⁹ Ibid.

of opinion was both tolerated and greatly influenced the alliance as well as U.S. decision-making.¹⁰

When the Warsaw Pact disappeared in 1991 and the Soviets agreed to withdraw their troops from Central Europe, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe found themselves in an institutional and security vacuum. The region's governments realized that they lacked the capacity to defend themselves in what then appeared to be a highly unstable environment. The post-Cold War period presented Central and Eastern European states with a host of security and political stability threats for which they were totally unprepared.¹¹ Along with the institutions of political self-determination, the framework of civil-military relations in Central European states would need to be entirely re-built from the ground up. Nevertheless, the great lesson for those charged with the rebuilding project is that a 'cookie-cutter' approach would not do. Historical and societal context supremely matters. In the Polish case, the historical relationship of the army with society as well as the role of the church supported the esteem of the armed forces, although the perception may not be appropriate by modern standards. In the Czechoslovakian and Hungarian cases, the army was seen as a needless burden in national life, which had failed in the key moments. Further, in all cases, life in the ranks of conscripts was a mindless and brutal time to be endured and was seen as just another facet of a life tethered to Moscow. Such might have been slightly less the case in Poland, but all three shared this civil-military reality of a life in arms and alliances just the same.¹²

D. INCUBATION OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

Probably the most significant element of NATO's post-Cold War adaptation is not its enlargement but its transformation. As the Cold War was coming to a close, determining what to do about an alliance, developed solely to fight the Cold War, needed to be addressed before enlargement could even be considered. Could NATO still be

¹⁰ For numerous examples of the influence of the NATO member states on NATO decision-making as well as American foreign policy, see Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 1995.

¹¹ Zoltan Barany, *The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies* (Cambridge, UK: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 2003), 15.

¹² Abenheim, "Unpublished Narrative," October 21, 2003.

relevant? The history that led to the answer to this question has been addressed at length in many other works. NATO's role has evolved greatly and now emphasizes its power projection role. This has evolved by broadly interpreting 'Article 6' of the original North Atlantic Treaty to include 'out-of-area' missions far outside the European theater, like the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. The role of NATO has also transformed itself by broadening the assumption of responsibility for European security, by use of "Article 10" of the Charter. "Article 10" defines procedures for the admittance of new European members. The answer to the transformation question greatly changed the dynamics of European security.¹³ It was only when this happened that questions regarding the enlargement of NATO into Central Europe could be contemplated.

NATO's decisions regarding its future were being debated almost concurrently as the Soviet Union collapsed and broke apart, and the Warsaw Pact began to disintegrate starting in 1989. Many feared the worst and the countries of Central Europe, in part, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, as well as East Germany clawed for the security under the umbrella of the only area of stability left -- to the West. The merger of East and West Germany opened up new possibilities for the others. Perspectives regarding how to proceed varied greatly. NATO gingerly began to entertain the possibility of future enlargement, first by establishing the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in November of 1991 as a consultative body, thus bringing together the member countries of NATO with first nine -- then eleven -- new independent states of Central and Eastern Europe. And later, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) was launched. PfP developed in January 1994 as a way to build relationships. It was also a way to quietly support the demands of the new democracies. It allowed the West to support new civil-military relations practices and to refashion Central European defense sectors against the chorus of opposition from Moscow. Even the Russians were brought in the tent as a PfP participant. While many might have first thought of PfP as a program with only a

¹³ Thomas S. Szayna, "NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping," 17.

'hypothetical' use, cooperation was immediately tested when PfP states were called on to support peace enforcement actions in former Yugoslavia and elsewhere.¹⁴

Indeed, it is difficult to believe that the political will would have emerged to make NATO enlargement a reality, had it not been for the war in the states of former Yugoslavia. However, the war in Bosnia and elsewhere brought bitter memories of 20th century Europe into NATO's backyard, in spite of efforts to ignore what was happening. European ethnic tensions reemerged, leading to a brutal war with the possibility that the conflict would spread to other states. The war stoked repressed memories of refugees and accusations of genocide. It occurred to many that perhaps Europe had not changed at all and, with the Soviet Union gone, only American hegemonic glue could hold the former Warsaw pact states together. Additionally, after the failure of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to keep the peace in former Yugoslavia, it became apparent to many that only NATO had the military attributes necessary to impose the peace. As such, the new role for NATO was no longer geared to a hypothetically threat. The severe change in the emphasis of NATO's purpose was hard for some to grasp and others to accept. However, enough did accept NATO's new responsibility emphasis to create the conditions to expand to alliance.

Perhaps the desires to exist as a happy part of a civil-military Western model was somewhat a naiveté in the hearts and minds of those in central Europe. For no single model could be said to exist, and the Central Europeans somewhat underestimated the congenital problems of security and defense that accompany civil-military relations in the Euro-Atlantic sphere. In at least the Polish and Czechoslovak cases, nostalgia of happier times may have played a role. These countries had been allies of the West from 1939 to 1945 and their soldiers had fought the Axis integrated within United Nations forces. The Hungarians, though coerced to serve with the Nazi's during the Second World War, had been linked militarily with Central Europe for centuries, and naturally oriented themselves westward in the quest to distance themselves from their former oppressors.¹⁵

¹⁴ Several books have been written to outline in detail the progression of events leading to the enlargement of NATO during the 1990s. One citation among many is by Ronald D. Asmus, "Opening NATO's Door", New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.

¹⁵ Abenheim, "Unpublished Narrative," October 21, 2003.

In the brief, hectic years of the first reforms, which then led to the decision by NATO in the fall of 1995 to embark upon the process of enlargement into Central Europe, the areas of effort concerned such things as:

- The drafting of national defense legislation within new constitutions so as to provide a legal basis for defense as well as the drafting of national security strategies and defense doctrines;
- The establishment of parliamentary oversight of the security and defense sector;
- The re-establishment or establishment of ministries of defense and general staffs as well as the working out of an inter-agency process compatible with the NATO planning process;
- The democratization of civil-military relations within the ranks of the armed forces, which, in practical terms, meant the re-assignment of the political officers and the reorientation of the officer corps to Western style roles and missions as well as the lessening of the burdens of service on conscripts (i.e. draftees);
- The reduction in the size of offensively oriented central European land and air forces to expeditionary NATO missions -- first PfP as part of IFOR and SFOR;
- The long process of interoperability with NATO which meant anything from a revision of logistics doctrine and equipment to the dictates of the PfP Planning and Review Process;
- And most important, the use of the institutions of training and education to enable soldiers and defense civilians at all levels to participate in Euro-Atlantic integration as equal partners through a decades long process of discovery, experiment and progress.¹⁶

It has always been the case to some extent that NATO was asking aspiring countries to meet a large amount of criteria – both military and nonmilitary. However, just because a country meets all of the elaborated pre-accession criteria does not mean that a country is guaranteed accession. The act of inviting a state to join ultimately remains a political decision to be made by NATO members.¹⁷ Nevertheless, membership has always somewhat been linked to a country's behavior in meeting criteria.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ "Study on NATO Enlargement", NATO, September 1995, paragraphs 4-7. Internet site <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicst/enl-9501.htm>, accessed July 27, 2003.

By the late 1990s, the suitability for NATO membership, evolved greatly from the way NATO handled enlargement prior to 1989 during the Cold War. The first round of post Cold War NATO accessions, completed in 1999, was accomplished deliberately but without the benefit of much relevant experience. The criteria for membership was refined, as the possibility of enlargement became a reality. The original post Cold War criterion for prospective members – the so called “Perry Principles” -- was an evolving target but was generally established in September of 1995. The main conditions included:

- A functioning democratic political system (including free and fair elections and respect for individual liberty and the rule of law) and a market economy.
- Democratic-style civil-military relations.
- Treatment of minority populations in accordance with Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) guidelines.
- Resolution of disputes with neighboring countries and a commitment to solving international disputes peacefully.
- A military contribution to the alliance and a willingness to take steps to achieve interoperability with other alliance members.¹⁸

This criterion, utilized for the 1999 accessants, has been further refined for the 2004 aspirants and led to the MAP.

E. MEMBERSHIP ACTION PLAN (MAP)

PfP states that are singled out by NATO and its members as potentially important additions to NATO alliance are allowed to engage in a regular set of interactions and receive assistance through an outreach entity known as the Membership Action Plan (MAP).¹⁹ The MAP countries include the seven second-round aspirants expected to achieve membership in 2004 along with Macedonia and Albania – two that are being judged as not being ready for membership in the near future.²⁰ The criteria for NATO's current Membership Action Plan (MAP) was developed as the process of the 1999

¹⁸ “Study on NATO Enlargement,” *NATO - Online Library*, September 1995, paragraphs 4–7 and 70–78; <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/enl-9501.htm>, accessed July 27, 2003.

¹⁹ Szayna, “NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping,” 2001, 27.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 50.

accession states transformed themselves from their Cold War defensive posture into an organization dedicated to the collective and cooperative security of its members was ongoing. A fair reading of the MAP criteria shows the extent to which the alliance has transformed itself.

NATO's 1999 demonstration of its commitment to enlargement has paid dividends in terms of regional stability. It has provided the new independent states of Central and Eastern Europe an incentive to pursue reform and to settle disputes with neighboring countries.²¹ This is compatible with the fact that its mission has been extended to include conflict prevention and conflict management, both inside as well as outside its traditional boundaries.²² NATO's current agenda is concerned with the democratization and integration of its members as well as its partners.

In April of 1999, the MAP was ratified. It formally outlined membership standards for aspirants that are close to the 1995 criterion for prospective members, but provided even greater detail regarding how to make membership accession a reality for those countries NATO chooses. The Membership Action Plan is somewhat lengthy and is divided into five chapters. For the purposes here, the general criterion is as follows:²³

- **Political and Economic issues** – These include aspirants willingness to assume commitments under the North Atlantic agreement; settle disputes peacefully; demonstrate commitment to the rule of law and human rights; establish democratic control of armed forces; promote stability, economic liberty, social justice, and environmental responsibility; be willing to unite efforts in collective defense; share the responsibilities, costs, as well as the benefits of the alliance; participate fully in the Alliance decision making; and commit to the openness of the Alliance.
- **Defense/Military issues** – Ability of aspirant to contribute to the collective defense; commitment to gradual improvement military capability; full participation in PfP; be prepared to share in the roles, risks, responsibilities, benefits and burdens of common security as well as collective defense; willingness to subscribe to Alliance strategy as set out in the Strategic Concept and other Ministerial statements.
- **Resource issues** – Willingness of aspirant to commit sufficient budget resources to meet the commitments of membership, have national

²¹ Ibid., 9.

²² Ibid., 1.

²³ "Membership Action Plan" (MAP), *NATO*, Press Release NAC S(99)66, 24 April 99, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-66e.html> [accessed 4/28/2003]

structures in place to deal with those resources, participate in the Alliance's common-funded activities at the agreed cost-shares.

- **Security issues** – Upon accession, aspirant is expected to have sufficient safeguards and procedures in place to ensure the security of the most sensitive information as laid down in NATO's security policy.
- **Legal issues** – Aspirant should insure domestic laws are compatible with NATO rules and regulations and accede to the North Atlantic Treaty and other agreements required by membership.

It is both striking and not by accident that the 1995 membership requirements as well as the current MAP criterion are very similar to the SPP objectives previously discussed.

F. RESEARCH CONSIDERATIONS

As the performance of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland since joining NATO are reviewed within the case studies, it is important to note that there are still a few critics of further enlargement, although their numbers have dwindled greatly in the last five or so years. While most agree that NATO has adapted and remains relevant in the new transatlantic security environment, there are issues undermining its long-term viability. First, there are questions about the appropriateness and ability of the alliance to reorient itself to project power outside its traditional territory. Additionally, consideration regarding what is in the strategic interest of the alliance is another question that could cause serious disagreements.

Second, the current lack of an imminent challenger to transatlantic security provides an incentive for individual member states to contribute nothing ("free ride") or contribute little ("easy ride") to the alliance, leaving it to other members to take on a disproportionate share of the burden.²⁴ Already, there have been calls for a procedure to "sanction" or revoke the membership of states that do not contribute.²⁵ Many states in the alliance are currently having difficulty generating the political resolve to keep their commitments. Related to this is the exacerbation of the so-called "uncoupling" of the alliance. Problems of agreement regarding the 'justice-of-a-given-cause' are bound to

²⁴ Szayna, "NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping," 2001, 14.

²⁵ Celeste A. Wallander, "NATO's Price – Shape Up or Ship Out", *Foreign Affairs*, December 1, 2002, accessed <http://www.expandnato.org/natosprice.html>, accessed 7/23/2003.

follow. Having more members might make it more difficult to find compromises, and may cause both sides of the Atlantic to lose patience, so the argument goes.

All of these arguments weaken when one considers the alternatives with an eye towards what happened in Europe in the 20th century. For this reason, the majority of those in a policymaking role support NATO enlargement as evidenced by the fact that the second round of enlargement is proceeding as planned.

To be sure, in the aftermath of the November of 2002 NATO Prague Summit, the situation today differs from that which the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland faced when invited to join NATO at the Madrid Summit in 1997. Certainly, the MAP provides the new round entrants an advantage. Nevertheless, the parallels are sufficiently great for the new invitees to benefit from the previous experiences, as will be covered. Therefore, this thesis includes three case studies designed to determine what can be learned from the 1999 accession that can be of benefit to the 2004 aspirants.

The next three chapters are the cases studies of the 1999 NATO accessants. Chapter II will examine the Czech Republic, Chapter III will examine Hungary, and Chapter IV will examine Poland. Each case study will discuss the history of each state's progress of integrating into NATO since 1999. It will look at how well integration has transpired since that time. It will outline both the challenges that have been met as well as those still being faced. It also outlines the successes and failures in the face of programs that have been undertaken to facilitate integration.

Chapter V of the thesis will draw conclusions from the aggregate experiences of the three case studies and will try to see how those conclusions can be applied to support the integration of the 2004 aspirants. It will also point out some differences between the circumstances of the two sets of states involved in recent NATO expansion (i.e. 1999 vs. 2004) and why lessons may not always apply. In general, it contends that, in view of the experiences thus far with the integration of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland into NATO, expansion can only be seen as a ringing success so far. Nevertheless, NATO can count on continued challenges with the 2004 aspirants. Where possible, Chapter V will propose solutions to the challenges of expansion. It will also point out how some issues, often identified as problems associated with expansion, are actually more general in nature. Lastly, this thesis will attempt to point out actions that both the aspirant

countries as well as the alliance members can take to address general problems in the alliance, as they apply to our case studies.

G. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

The three case studies included in this thesis will empirically assess the progress of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland after their 1999 accession into NATO. It will also assess their future plans to continue to pursue full integration into the NATO security architecture and, where possible, will make a judgment as to what lessons can be garnered as the 2004 aspirants continue their accession process after membership is achieved. As we look at each 1999 accessant, we will generally be reviewing the criteria outlined in the NATO MAP as it applies to integration.

A variety of sources were used to develop this thesis and are outlined in the bibliography. Primary sources include news reports, NATO publications, directives, plans, and presentations. Secondary sources include newsletters, periodicals, professional journals, NATO publications, scholarly books, and essays as well as research papers related to NATO integration.

II. INTEGRATION OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC INTO NATO

Prague, once the victim of the Warsaw Pact, became the city where the Warsaw Pact met its end as an instrument of the Cold War.

President Vaclav Havel, July 1, 1991

In March of 1999, the Czech Republic was one of the first three former Warsaw Pact members to achieve NATO membership along with Hungary and Poland. These countries achieved membership after a significant debate within the alliance as to whether expansion was politically and strategically appropriate. However, there is a difference between achieving NATO accession versus achieving NATO integration, in terms of a new entrant fulfilling its assigned security role. At a time when seven more new independent states of Europe will most likely be approved for membership in May of 2004, now is an excellent time to take stock of the progress of the 1999 round of NATO membership accessants to see what lessons can be garnered.

This chapter offers a case study of the Czech Republic's integration into NATO, four and one-half years after accession has been achieved to see what can be learned. It looks at both the progress that the Czech military has achieved and the problems that it faces on an operational level. It looks at causes of resource problems and finds that they are being driven by political factors partially due to the public's perception. It also looks at what effects these factors have had on integration and attempts to draw conclusions and make general recommendations.

A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The societal and historical context is shown to be playing a significant role in the progress of the Czech military. In modern history, politicians have determined the fate of the Czech nation -- not the military. The army was prepared to defend Czechoslovakia after the First World War. However, it was mostly disassembled by politicians prior to the Second World War, leading to the Nazi occupation during the war. Anti-military sentiments, developed by Czechs in the Austro-Hungarian period continued into the communist era. Few citizens supported the communist government's claimed fight

against the imperialist West. At no time, did the army effectively intervene in any transformation process. During 1989, it quickly became apparent that the army would not intervene in the political transformation, making it a non-player again.²⁶ Once communism ended, effective civilian control of the military was almost automatic.²⁷

The armed forces were in a state of severe transformation when the Czech Republic, a relatively new independent state, was invited to apply to join NATO in 1997. In 1993 Czechoslovakia had just been divided into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in what has become to be known as the “velvet divorce”. By 1996, the Czech Republic was widely considered by some to be the strongest candidate for NATO membership at that time in spite of the state of the military. Slovakia, the former Czechoslovakia’s other half, was also considered a strong candidate at the time but its evolving domestic politics took a wrong turn and consideration of Slovakia for NATO membership was delayed.²⁸

During pre-accession talks in 1997, concerns about the Czech Republic’s ability to support NATO began to emerge as well. Some members had difficulty reaching an agreement to invite the Czech Republic, based on the belief that the Czechs had little to offer the alliance and in view of the expenses they would generate for the alliance. There were also concerns about a lack of enthusiasm from the Czech public for membership compared to the other candidates and the reluctance for Czech politicians to step up their military spending to a level necessary to make a military transformation.²⁹ Members questioned not only when, but if the Czech military would be far enough advanced to contribute to the collective defense of the alliance in view of the struggles they were having to reform.³⁰ Still very much a military in the style of the now defunct Warsaw Pact, it was apparent that the Czechs were having trouble meeting NATO standards.³¹ In the end, Czechs addressed the NATO members concerns to the extent necessary, and the

²⁶ Maria Vlachová, “Professionalization of the Army of the Czech Republic,” *The Challenge of Military Reform in Postcommunist Europe: Building Professional Armed Forces*, Andrew Cotter, Timothy Edmunds, Anthony Forster, Editors. (New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2002), 34.

²⁷ Simon, *NATO Enlargement and Central Europe: A Study in Civil Military Relations*, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press Publications, 1996), 242.

²⁸ Asmus, *Opening NATO’s Door*, 154.

²⁹ Barany, *The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies*, 23.

³⁰ Szayna, “NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping,” 10.

³¹ Asmus, *Opening NATO’s Door*, 147.

Czech Republic was invited to meet qualifications to become an alliance member at the Madrid conference in July of 1997. While membership was supposed to be finalized by December of 1998, the Czechs required an additional three months to address issues of compatibility with NATO air defenses, as well as to pass legislation in the Czech Republic that would permit them to comply with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty dealing with collective defense.³² Membership was finally achieved in March of 1999. In spite of the difficulties, the Czech Republic can only be commended for the progress they made in a short time frame allowing them to meet sufficient standards to be granted membership status.

Like all of the 1999 NATO entrants, the Czechs still had significant work to do to achieve useful military integration into NATO after their membership had been achieved. The Czech Republic's progress well illustrates that membership was not a cure for its ongoing problems. Since 1999, NATO leaders have consistently criticized the Czechs for not meeting their own spending goals in order to speed integration.³³ NATO Secretary-General, Lord Robertson, and Joseph Ralston, Supreme Commander of NATO Forces in Europe, have repeatedly expressed their concern and displeasure with the pace of military reforms and the lack of proper coordination and supervision in the Czech Republic.³⁴ During the first three years of membership, the Czechs had a slow start in meeting force goal timetables and are still having problems sustaining progress.

B. OBSTACLES TO INTEGRATION

The newly independent Czech Republic started out with even fewer advantages militarily than it had politically as it pursued integration with the West. Because of the crushing of the "Prague Spring" revolt in 1968 and in keeping with Warsaw Pact doctrine, the Czechoslovak military was not allowed to develop a separate command structure. As such, there were few defense and security experts around, in or out of government, when the Czechoslovaks received independence. To address their security needs, the government copied a blueprint from Moscow's security doctrine, which put the

³² Karel Kovanda, "Preparing for Membership," *NATO Review*, Spring 2003, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue1/english/special.html>, accessed April 24, 2003.

³³ Barany, *The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies*, I.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 27.

Czech military in “offensive” posture representative of the Warsaw Pact. This blueprint had little applicability to today’s western security posture.³⁵ The Czech Republic still lacked the experts who could articulate a detailed understanding of the inter-workings or requirements of the NATO alliance. Whatever understanding did exist remained limited to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. These people had neither a reason, nor a mechanism for making NATO membership a subject of wider public debate.³⁶

It really took until 2002 for the country to achieve a consensus over what type of military it wanted. Even now, plans are being changed constantly in response to reduced resources. From the beginning, there have continued to be stories of inefficiency, corruption, and misappropriation of funds.³⁷ The political and transitional circumstances in the former Warsaw Pact states make the existence of these problems understandable, and they are certainly not unique to the Czech military.

There have been many negative trends slowing the progress of the integration into NATO for the Czech Republic. First, the office of Defense Minister has been a revolving door. Due primarily to the frequency with which the Czech government has turned over, there have been twelve different Defense Ministers since 1993 and none have stayed for more than two years. In coordination with the evolving administrations of the parliamentary majorities by whom they were chosen, each minister has had a different concept of how the ministry should work. Most ministers did not even get an idea of what the military needed before they found themselves out of a job. Concepts have changed constantly and military officers have not been held accountable to obtain results.³⁸

With the end of the cold war and the continuing modernization of weapon systems, military downsizing is a fact of life for all transatlantic militaries, but is

³⁵ Jan Gazdik & Johanna Grohova, “NATO Membership Transforms Czech Military, Boosts National Confidence,” *The Prague Post*, November 12, 2002, http://www.praguepost.com/P/#/2002/Art/1113/news2_mafra.php, Accessed September 12, 2003.

³⁶ Ivan Gabal, Lenka Helsusova, and Thomas S. Szayna, “The Impact of NATO Membership in the Czech Republic: Changing Czech Views of Security, Military, and Defense,” Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, March 2002, 3.

³⁷ Jeremy Branton, “NATO: Czech Military Woes Prove Alliance Membership No Cure-All,” Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, November 18, 2002, <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/11/18112002172545.asp>, accessed July 23, 2003, 1.

³⁸ Ibid, 2.

probably more difficult in the new independent democracies of central Europe. In addition to a lack of continuity in the leadership positions in the Czech Republic, the continuing huge draw-down of forces from the 2002 level of 60,000 personnel, down to less than 45,000 personnel by 2006, means that several commanders and many military offices feel justifiably threatened to lose their well-paying jobs. They sometimes have a hard time accepting continuing downsizing plans. Like other countries including the U.S., it must be noted that the Czech military had already been cut by 40%, from an original force of 106,447 in 1993.³⁹ However, to a degree worse than other places, it is often alleged that officers countermand, refuse, ignore, or use passive resistance in the execution of the orders required by the reform programs. Additionally, because there are so many conscripts remaining that are no longer of significant use, two or three battalions sometimes need to be cannibalized to make one battalion to send abroad. While Czechs have preformed well on peacekeeping missions, the remaining forces struggle at home and morale continues to be a serious challenge. Currently, conscript soldiers that are being demobilized are overseeing, and sometimes stealing from, Communist era munitions stocks.⁴⁰

Downsizing is just one problem that has arisen from the conversion of a former communist army into a modern western army able to support the alliance. As in other former Warsaw Pact nations, defense intelligence continues to be problematic. Following numerous scandals, in April of 2003, the Defense Ministry leadership finally decided to disband and rebuild Military Intelligence. Preliminary results of top-secret investigations into the intelligence services past shows that members of the service were extensively abusing their powers. Its officers copied top-secret documents, computer files, and NATO materials. These investigations have also shown that the intelligence did not only operate abroad, but also recruited agents and took part in operations within the Czech Republic as well. Secret identities were created and clearances issued in a

³⁹ Jeffrey Simon, *NATO Enlargement and Central Europe: A Study in Civil Military Relations*, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press Publications, 1996), 217.

⁴⁰ Branston, "NATO: Czech Military Woes Prove Alliance Membership No Cure-All", 3.

manner that was not in keeping with current legislation.⁴¹ In the end, it was decided that the military intelligence service could not be salvaged.

Other concerns slowing integration involve questions about military procurement. While complaints over procurement decisions often arise in militaries, the charges tend to be even fiercer in new democratic states of Europe and elsewhere. In the Czech Republic, the frequent turnover of the government probably also exacerbates these charges. According to Jan Gazdik, a former officer and journalist knowledgeable on the Czech military, successive Czech governments have been accused of making political procurement decisions far different than what the military experts advise. As a result, it is often alleged that budget appropriations have been used poorly. The first well known incident of this was the infamous parachute scandal. In 1996, the army bought a large quantity of newly designed parachutes. A company that had never previously manufactured parachutes won the contract. The parachutes were alleged to be of poor quality, causing several accidents and even one death. Although it was clear that the parachutes were substandard and overpriced, the army kept purchasing them until the year 2000. The result is that the army has stores full of useless parachutes according to Gardik.⁴²

Procurement concerns also plagued the Czech Air Force and have been a political and fiscal point of contention for many years. A recent example involves the decision to buy Czech-made L-159 subsonic tactical fighter jets against the recommendations of NATO officials. Many analysts feel that the purchase was aimed at rescuing an ailing industry. In the short run, this purchase is taking 80% of the defense budget aimed towards appropriations. The remaining 20% is not enough to modernize the remaining parts of the armed forces. While second-guessing of purchase decisions is commonplace in all democracies, it seems to be more commonplace in discussing the Czech Military and may have to do with the lack of expertise previously discussed.

Currently, the Czech Republic has the least capable Air Force of the three newest NATO members. It uses forty substandard MiG-21 fighter planes in the supersonic class

⁴¹ Tomas Horejsi, "Minister Tvrdik to Replace Army Intelligence Chief." *Prague Lidove Noviny*, April 8, 2003, <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/czech/armyint.html>, accessed September 12, 2003.

⁴² Branston, "NATO: Czech Military Woes Prove Alliance Membership No Cure-All", 2.

that will soon need to be scrapped because their service life has ended.⁴³ Nevertheless, the Czechs have decided that it is important that they maintain the capability to protect their own airspace, in spite of NATO Secretary George Robertson's recommendations to the contrary in February 2001. Robertson noted that NATO air resources could be used to control Czech airspace in the short run, freeing money's that could be put into other modernization projects NATO integration requires.⁴⁴ In response to Robertson's recommendation, Christian Democrat deputy chairman and former defense minister Miroslav Kalousek said, "the Czech Republic should be able to protect its airspace using its own forces in the future – otherwise it would be giving up its own sovereignty." Kalousek noted that the only NATO countries that do not have the capability to protect their own air space were Iceland and Luxembourg. Other voices echoed the call for new aircraft in spite of the fiscal drain that would delay the modernization of the army.⁴⁵

The future acquisition of Air Force assets has been debated since the origins of the Czech Republic. In the late 1990s, the Czech's were attempting to buy new supersonic fighters. Due to questionable purchase practices and charges of corruption involving the bidding procedures regarding four of the five international bidders, the legislature shelved the acquisition in 2000.⁴⁶ In the same time period, it was decided that the Czech Republic would push forward with the equivalent of one billion dollars to make the controversial purchase of the 72 Czech-made L-159 subsonic attack planes mentioned earlier. While the number has been reduced, the purchase of these will continue to eat up most of the country's defense budget earmarked for modernization for the next few years, though the military value of the planes remains somewhat in doubt.

In addition to the L-159s, the Czech government still plans to spend an additional \$1.6 billion for as many as 36 Western supersonic aircraft like the JAS-39 Gripen fighter, but the size of its defense budget makes this a long-term proposition at best.⁴⁷ At the

⁴³ "Integrating New Allies into NATO," *CBO Paper*, Congressional Budget Office, Washington, D.C., October 2000, 20.

⁴⁴ "Czech Republic Should Protect own Air Space in Future." *Financial Times Information*, Global News Wire, CTK Czech News Agency, February 22, 2001.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ "Integrating New Allies into NATO," *CBO Paper*, 20.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 20.

present time, Czech officials are discussing possibly leasing aircraft when the MiG service life expires.⁴⁸

C. PLANS FOR REFORM

Realizing that they had integration challenges that required tracking, in May of 2001, the Czech defense department developed a comprehensive report entitled *Two Years into NATO* to help them track their progress. The report notes that, during accession talks, the Czechs would not only avail themselves to opportunities relating to membership, but also fully stand up to their implied commitment. The report intends to track the harmonization of NATO and Czech priorities. It notes that “the public requires a fundamental reform of the Armed Forces to be necessary for appropriate national defense.”⁴⁹ The report noted diplomatically what was later stated by then Defense Minister Jaroslav Tvrdik when he said:

In the past, too many senior members of the Armed Forces have not understood the importance of aligning the armed forces to be integrated into the NATO structure. Yet, the NATO structure is what gives the Czech Republic its primary defensive and security capability. Specifically, the Czech military has not succeeded in applying principles of modern management. As a result, the size of the armed forces and the fact that it remains primarily a force made up of conscripts has not been well addressed. The current military has been resourced based on where it has been instead of where it is going. There is not a linkage between requirements and resources. Many NATO critical tasks have been assigned to reservists who are not deployable abroad under the Czech system and whose training has been of uneven quality.⁵⁰

On May 14, 2001, the Czech government made the decision to establish the “Commission for Preparation of the Reform of the Armed Forces” and to place that commission directly under the Minister of Defense. This commission was the primary planning body. By August of 2001, this committee produced a draft of the *Military*

⁴⁸ Rick Rozoff, “NATO Spends Billions for Czech Military Bases,” *Czech Happenings*, March 13, 2003. <http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/view-id.php?id=20030313F02900>, accessed September 12, 2003.

⁴⁹ “Two Years into NATO: Integration of the Czech Republic in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from the Viewpoint of the Defense Department - BC8554,” Prague: Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic, 2001.

⁵⁰ Jaroslav Tvrdik, “Effective Membership.” *The Prague Summit*, November 2002, <http://www.vlada.cz>, accessed September 9, 2003.

Strategy of the Czech Republic, which was developed and later ratified as policy by the parliament in April 2002 with alternations. The strategy continued the refinement of plans to transition the military from its current conscription army to a smaller, fully professional force by the year 2006. If successful, the Czech Republic will become the first former communist state in Europe to completely reform its armed forces from a conscription force to an all professional army in only six years – a plan that others are following.⁵¹ Major General Jaroslav Skopek, former Deputy Minister of Defense, was put in charge of the development of the strategy and won praise for innovative approaches. However, he warned that, “...there is a limit to the pace that changes can take place.” He noted that it was important that the proposed budget be maintained to allow the reforms to stay on schedule.⁵²

The plan calls for a two-stage reorganization of the armed forces. The first phase has already begun and will conclude by December 31, 2006. By that time, the compulsory conscript system will be phased out in favor of professional soldiers. The Czechs hope that their forces will be able to meet all of the commitments of the alliance as well as undertaking the required national defense tasking. Unfortunately, the Czech government has fallen behind in funding these initiatives.⁵³

The second phase of the Military Strategy is projected to be complete between 2010 and 2012, depending on the availability of resources. By that time, the Czechs hope to achieve worldwide autonomous logistical support for long-term operations, a modern system of command and control, and interoperability with other allied forces. They anticipate that force restructuring will be complete and will be divided between immediate reaction forces, rapid reaction forces, lower readiness forces, and reserve forces. All of these forces are projected to fully meet NATO standards.⁵⁴

In addition to the reorganization of the armed forces, the Military Strategy outline plans to meet four broad strategic aims: to be able to deploy forces abroad if action is

⁵¹ Jeremy Bransten, “Czech Republic: Government Moves to Abolish Conscription, Joins European Trend,” Radio Free Europe, 31 August 2001, <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/08/31082001114832.asp>, accessed September 12, 2003.

⁵² Branston, “NATO: Czech Military Woes Prove Alliance Membership No Cure-All”, 2.

⁵³ Tvrdik, “Effective Membership,” *The Prague Summit*, November 2002.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

necessary; to be able to defend Czech airspace; to help in emergencies such as the floods of August 2002; and to have the capacity to bring reinforcements from abroad.⁵⁵

D. ASSESSMENT OF REFORMS

On April 29, 2002, retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General Daniel Schroeder conducted an assessment of the Czech reform plans on behalf of NATO. General Schroeder was highly impressed with the Czech plans and the progress made at fulfilling them. He noted that the entire planning process took place in only a little more than a year, in spite of the complexity of the task. He felt that the plans were comprehensive and thorough. Much of the report discussed details of the basic force restructure, the professionalization of the military and the difficulties associated with the process. It was noted that there are still many detailed programs that need to be established. For example, the strategic concept calls for the creation of a Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), which still needs to be established. With the creation of a new professional volunteer force, Schroeder estimated that it would take 15 years to establish a professional NCO and Officer corps because of the experience required in these positions.⁵⁶

Possibly hinting at the history of Czech civil-military relations shortcomings throughout his report, Schroeder discusses the commitment required by the parliament as well as the military to make the tenets of the military strategy a reality. The report stresses the need for the government to continue to fund the Czech army at the 2.2% of GNP budget amount that was promised. As we will learn, the promise to fund the military at that level was quickly broken by the parliament in the summer of 2003. The report stresses the need for the military and the parliament to interact and suggests that the military work harder to promote its requirements. Schroeder discusses the need for the military to “market” the reform program, both within and outside the Czech military.

⁵⁵ Katya Zapletnyuk, “Czech Military Reforms Could End in Ruins,” *Transitions Online*, June 6, 2003, http://www.onus.net/artman/publish/article_5447.shtml, accessed September 12, 2003.

⁵⁶ Daniel Schroeder, Lt. General, US Army,ret. “Assessment of the Reform of the Armed forces of the Czech Republic.” Defense Ministry of the Czech Republic, June 6, 2002. <http://www.army.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=780>, accessed July 31, 2003.

He notes that the passage of new legislation by the parliament would be necessary to implement the entire plan, again requiring support from the parliament.⁵⁷

Schroeder points out that the “devil is in the details”. He stresses that better documentation outlining the functionality of all processes is required. He also notes that, to be effective, a professional military requires a “merit based” Performance Evaluation System (PES), both to motivate the members and determine future promotions competitively. The report also discusses the difficulties in making the cultural shift away from a cold war military mentality. As such, the Czech needs to set up a system to recruit volunteers, based on human resource marketing models. They need to develop a modern personnel system using a “life cycle management” approach. They need to improve their system of cost forecasting using activity based costing models. They also need to set timelines for implementation of all these processes. Lastly, Schroeder’s report stresses the need to address quality of life issues and acceptable standards necessary to maintain a professional military.⁵⁸ The Schroeder report appears to be an accurate assessment of the status of the Czech military, and correlates with strengths and weaknesses found within other sources of information.

E. FORCE RESTRUCTURING

Force restructuring has been identified as job one for the Czech Army and is well underway. While plans have been reduced recently, the 2002 Strategic Plan calls for forces to be reduced another 40-percent to between 34,000 to 36,000 personnel in 2006, with an additional 10,000 supporting civilian personnel. Further, the strategic plan calls for these forces to be reinforced by 27,000 reserve forces. Approximately fifteen to twenty percent of the overall Czech forces are to be made up of officers with the remaining enlisted members. The expectation is that by offering forces better pay, career development, and pensions, the quality of recruiting and retention will be greatly improved at all levels.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Tvrdik, “Effective Membership,” *The Prague Summit*, November 2002.

The force makeup will be a Ground Forces Mechanized Division and an Air Force Joint Air Division. In response to recent terrorist threats, the reform also envisions the establishment of additional Special Forces. By agreement within the alliance, the Czech Republic will specialize in providing small units that can be mobilized independently, designed to detect chemical and biological agents as well as provide passive surveillance systems under the so-called “Prague Initiative.” The Czech Army will have a mobile unit for Passive Electronic Surveillance developed by 2006.⁶⁰

Like all of the Former Warsaw Pact countries, the Czech Military needs to develop a larger and better trained NCO corps and Junior Officer Corps and to encourage new officers to take greater initiative in line with modern Western military thinking.⁶¹ The army has been working to get away from top-down centralized thinking. The ratio of officers, warrant officers, and NCOs is being altered significantly. The officer corps will decrease while the number of Warrant officers and NCOs in the service will increase. The main problem is how to develop warrant Officers and recruit and train extended-service NCOs quickly. To date, programs have failed and the entire process is taking much longer than anticipated.⁶²

These types of changes inherently create concerns about civil-military relations any time an officer corps is reduced and officers are forced out. Predictably, this has been reported as a concern in the Czech Republic. In November of 2002, then Defense Minister Jaroslav Tvrdik was widely quoted in Czech newspapers for criticizing military commanders that he claims were obstructing reforms and subtly ignoring his orders. At the time, Tvrdik painted a picture of an overstaffed, directionless army equipped with outdated munitions, plagued by theft, and unable to fulfill most of its tasks, save for participation in limited foreign missions.⁶³

While restructuring is designed to get the older generation out of the service, at times, just the opposite has been happening. There have been press reports of an ongoing “brain drain” in the armed forces due to morale problems caused by the restructuring. It

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ “Integrating New Allies into NATO,” *CBO Paper*, viii.

⁶² Jeffery Simon, “Transforming the Armed Forces of Central and Eastern Europe,” *Strategic Forum*, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, No. 172, June 2000.

⁶³ Bransten, “NATO: Czech Military Woes Prove Alliance Membership NO cure-All.”

has been alleged that, instead of getting rid of the deadweight, many talented young officers have been leaving the service for the private sector.⁶⁴

F. MODERNIZATION EFFORTS

As previously mentioned, around 80-percent of the modernization budget is currently being used for the purchase of new fighters. The need to put the majority of the modernization budget into new fighters is because of the decision by Czech officials to maintain the ability to protect Czech airspace. This decision will greatly slow other modernization projects that would speed the Czech Republic's integration into the alliance. In addition to the fighter procurement, another reason the Czechs have not modernized most of their other weapons systems to become interoperable with NATO systems is because they have decided to first focus on force restructuring. The restructuring effort would seem to be the more appropriate way to begin in view of the limited resources. Other purchases being planned, all of which are more affordable than aircraft, include radars, night-vision devices, and "smart" munitions. Upgrades are planned for the Czechs' existing T-72 tanks, Mi-24 helicopters, and communications systems. The Czechs have also established a joint commission with Poland to help coordinate modernization programs.⁶⁵

G. NATO SUPPORT AND PERFORMANCE

On its first operation after becoming an alliance member, the Czech Army was reported to have initially left a poor image among older NATO members including the United States. Initial Czech conduct during Allied Force in Kosovo was reported to have been substandard compared to the other new accessants, Poland and Hungary. The Czech's required extensive tutoring from Brussels and Washington to perform effectively.⁶⁶ However, the problem was likely caused by a lack of enthusiasm for the operation on the part of the Czech public and their leaders because there was still

⁶⁴ "Integrating New Allies into NATO," *CBO Paper*, xi.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Gabal, Helsusova, and Szayna, "The Impact of NATO Membership in the Czech Republic: Changing Czech Views of Security, Military, and Defense," 3-4; Andrew Michta, *America's New Allies: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO*, (London: University of Washington Press, 1999) 196-197.

historical pro-Yugoslavian sentiment among the Czechs. A majority of the Czech population opposed the air campaign and many officials in the government, as well as members of the opposition parties, were reported to have tried to distance themselves from their responsibilities to NATO at the time.⁶⁷ In spite of this shaky start, Czech military performance in support of other NATO operations has been stellar. Czech troops have performed particularly well in peacekeeping missions in Kosovo as part of KFOR, and in Bosnia as part of SFOR. At any one time, about 175 Czech personnel are supporting KFOR in addition to an 85-person hospital battalion. They have also maintained up to 500 personnel as part of the SFOR at one time.⁶⁸ The Czech military has participated in setting up field hospitals in Albania, and has also participated in an elite anti-terrorist mission in Afghanistan within the last year as well.⁶⁹ While the Czech soldiers have received praise as consummate professionals on most overseas missions, at home, it has sometimes been a different story due to the high number of conscripts and morale problems as previously mentioned.⁷⁰ However, on balance, peacekeeping missions are felt to have a positive effect on both the esteem of the Czech military as well as the public's perception. Conflicts in the Balkans have demonstrated the value of armed forces in the European neighborhood. The Balkan efforts also demonstrates the importance of professional armed forces in the modern security environment.⁷¹

The Czech military has gained a very positive reputation for their work in defending against weapons of mass destruction. Their nuclear-biological-chemical (NBC) defense units have long been a niche specialty for the Czech army that has proven well prepared to take part in a variety of operations. NATO Secretary General George Robertson has said he would like to see the Czech Republic advance its NBC capabilities even further.⁷² A nuclear-biological-chemical defense company already is assigned to

⁶⁷ Ibid., 4. Public opinion surveys conducted by various polling agencies show a gradual decrease in the number of those who supported the NATO air campaign to 31% with 62% against it. IVVM, 1999.

⁶⁸ "Integrating New Allies into NATO," *CBO Paper*, 12.

⁶⁹ Gazdik and Grohova "NATO Membership Transforms Czech Military, Boosts National Confidence."

⁷⁰ Bransten, "NATO: Czech Military Woes Prove Alliance Membership NO cure-All."

⁷¹ Vlachová, "Professionalization of the Army of the Czech Republic," 34.

⁷² Frank Forest, "Prague's Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Protection Units Contribute to Alliance," *The Prague Post Online*, November 20, 2002, <http://www.praguepost.com/PO3/2002/Art/1120/news92.php>, accessed September 12, 2003.

NATO's Immediate Reaction Force. The Czech foray into niche specialization is indicative of a growing trend in European militaries, as countries figure out ways to work with the United States in military coalitions with limited budgets.⁷³ NATO officials hope that developing specialized units like these will be something that the Czechs can do more of in the future.⁷⁴

Czech officials have claimed that 78-percent of their current military is being made available for NATO missions at any one time, including 14-percent that will participate in the alliance's immediate and rapid reaction forces. However, the Czech army is still made up of a large percentage of conscripts making it unlikely that a high percentage of their forces could be called upon simultaneously at this juncture. The Czech Republic met its pledge to make a combat brigade available to the Rapid Reaction Corps by 2002. While one light airborne infantry battalion is considered ready today, the remainder of the Czech 4th Brigade is not to date.⁷⁵ Nevertheless, the Czechs have lived up to their commitment to NATO by remaining active in Partnership for Peace (PfP) exercises since joining the alliance, hosting two exercises.⁷⁶

By bringing the Czech Republic into the alliance, one of the positives was the ability to have access to Czech airspace and facilities in order to provide security for NATO's eastern territorial frontier. However, the condition of Czech facilities and military infrastructure is not up to standards. Before the country's acceptance into NATO, it completed 14 out of 52 target force goals that it intended to fulfill for NATO, most aimed at improving the interoperability of communications equipment, strengthen procedures, and increasing the country's ability to host allied troops and equipment. The Czechs have received positive marks from NATO experts in working on issues of command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C⁴I). They have integrated into the NATO air-defense system and are beginning to equip planes with IFF

⁷³ Elizabeth G. Book, "Czech Republic Chem-Bio Unit in Kuwait," *National Defense Magazine*, January 2003 <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/article.cfm?id=1018>, accessed September 12, 2003.

⁷⁴ "Integrating New Allies into NATO," *CBO Paper*, 19.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 12.

equipment. Czech airfields, however, are not able to accept reinforcements from NATO armies because the runways are not long enough and fuel stores are inadequate.⁷⁷

It has been the complaint of anti-NATO expansion groups that NATO member countries will invest a total of \$1.9-billion (5.4 billion crowns) into military infrastructure projects in the Czech Republic, making Czech enlargement less than cost effective. Based on the estimates of the Congressional Budget Office, these cost estimates seem greatly exaggerated. Most of these projects relate to the defense of airspace and include communications and information systems, the improvement of two airports, and most of two NATO air space protection radars. NATO will also foot the bill for the Czech connection to the joint anti-aircraft protection system, called NATINEADS, for central Europe.⁷⁸ There is little doubt that NATO is accepting a substantial expense to upgrade Czech defense facilities.

H. MILITARY APPROPRIATIONS

Like many of the former Warsaw Pact nations, attempting to get a portion of the limited funding for military reform to comply with NATO standards against other competing interests has proved problematic for the Czech military. Alliance membership has placed a significant economic burden on new members. The Czech Republic is no exception. Since 1997, NATO leaders have repeatedly castigated the Czechs for the relatively modest sums they have spent on defense in spite of their pledges to reform their militaries in accordance with NATO criteria. NATO has asked that at least 2.0-percent of GDP be designated to defense by each country joining NATO in 1999. While the Czechs have raised their percentage of spending since the late 1990s, the Czech Republic as well as Hungary have both had difficulty meeting this request consistently.⁷⁹

As previously mentioned, the budgetary figure of 2.2 percent of GDP was approved as policy within the *Military Strategy of the Czech Republic* in April of 2002, and the Czechs made commitments to NATO in November of 2002 at the Prague Conference based on that budget. However, in response to mounting deficits of public

⁷⁷ Ibid., 20.

⁷⁸ Rozoff, "NATO Spends Billions for Czech Military Bases," *Czech Happenings*, March 13, 2003.

⁷⁹ Barney, *The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies*, 1.

finance, the Czech parliament has already reneged on its promise for military appropriations. During the summer of 2003, the parliament reduced the planned annual 2.2 percent of GDP appropriated to the military down to 1.9-percent of GDP.⁸⁰ This is less than the 2.0 percent figure NATO is requesting of its newest members.⁸¹ In protest, Czech Defense Minister Jaroslav Tvrdil resigned this summer warning that the country's attempt to professionalize its army, specialize the military, and boost its defense capabilities could not be accomplished within the constraints of the reduced budget. He claimed that the planned Czech reforms could end "in ruins". Tvrdil has been quoted as saying that "...reform is at a critical phase...at which point we will lose all our money and have to start again."⁸²

Interestingly, one major reason cited for the cuts to the Czech military is to cut their deficit, which is currently running near 5.0-percent (5.7 percent in 2001) of GDP, to around 4.0-percent of GDP by 2006. The goal of the country is to eventually reduce the deficit to under the maximum deficit standard the European Union (EU) allows so that the Czech's can qualify to utilize the EU's common currency standard. The Czech central bank would like the euro to replace the Czech crown in 2007. However, the deficit cannot exceed 3-percent for the Czech Republic to qualify. The Czech government is hoping to join the euro-zone in 2009.⁸³

While many are again questioning the Czechs commitment to NATO with the recent budget action, in fairness to the Czech government, they have had to confront some unforeseen budgetary pressures and many competing interests. Specifically, the central European floods in the summer of 2002 devastated the Czech infrastructure around Prague and beyond. Additionally, the economy has not recovered as quickly as expected from the worldwide recession.

Faced with the budget cuts, the military Chief of Staff, Pavel Stefka, has announced plans to reduce individual sectors of the armed forces rather than perform across the board cuts, which would downgrade all of his units. Stefka hopes that the Czech military will be able to support most of their commitments to collective defense

⁸⁰ Zapletnyuk, "Czech Military Reforms Could End in Ruins," *Transitions Online*, June 6, 2003.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 228.

⁸² Zapletnyuk, "Czech Military Reforms Could End in Ruins," *Transitions Online*, June 6, 2003.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

and “...others [in the alliance] can complement the sectors we lack.”⁸⁴ The current cutbacks are aimed to reduce the forces from the planned number of 45,000, including 10,000 civilians outlined in the 2002 strategic plan, to just 30,000 including 7,000 civilians. The number of bases will likely be cut from a projected end state of 77 to a maximum of 66. Cuts will extend to anti-aircraft units, Mi-17 and Mi-24 Helicopters, and the Czech built L-159 light combat planes will be reduced in number from a planned purchase of 72 to just 18. They had previously abandoned plans to purchase twenty-four JAS-39 Gripen supersonic fighters. The number of tanks earmarked for modernization will drop from approximately 250 to just 30. The only winners will be the Special Forces whose numbers will grow under current proposals. Currently, the military is plagued by a host of morale problems due to uncertainty created by the budget cuts.⁸⁵ While Czech politicians claim that almost all of the alliance commitments made at the November 2002 Prague Conference will be kept, they have sent a letter of warning to NATO that they will need to discuss the commitments they made again.⁸⁶

I. PUBLIC AND POLITICAL SUPPORT

Considering the tremendous institutional shift that was required after the fall of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the Czech Republic must be applauded for developing what appears to be a stable democracy and a working market economy in less than a decade, based on all indicators. This would seem to have been more difficult to achieve in the Czech Republic because a communist orthodoxy of control persisted over the country after the crushing of the “Prague Spring” in 1968, giving the Czechoslovaks nothing of a democratic warm-up period.⁸⁷ As such, there was no period of liberalization of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia prior to independence in 1989 like there was in Poland and Hungary. Nevertheless, all evidence shows that Czech Democracy and a market economy developed fairly rapidly. The Czech “Freedom House” scores are both excellent, listed as a “1” on the Human Rights

⁸⁴ Zapletnyuk, “Czech Military reforms Could End in Ruins,” *Transitions Online*, June 6, 2003.

⁸⁵ Magnus Bennett, “Czech Army Faces Budget Crunch,” *Prague Post Online*, July 24, 2003, <http://www.ocnus.net/artman/publish/article-6285.shtml>, accessed September 12, 2003.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Gazdik and Grohova “NATO Membership Transforms Czech Military, Boosts National Confidence.”

scale and a “2” on the Civil Liberties scale consistently from 1994 through 2000.⁸⁸ The Czech Republic does appear to have an above average amount of corruption against its central European counterparts with a rating of 3.7 on the corruption perception index in 2002, based on surveys conducted by Transparency International.⁸⁹ The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth has been running right at 2.9 percent through 2003 and is projected to grow and be around 3.6-percent through 2004. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is projected to increase by only .6 percent in 2003 and 1.2 percent in 2004. The inflation rate was a very manageable 4.7% in 2001, 1.8% in 2002 and is projected to be at 1.3% in 2003. The Czechs have had a slightly high but falling unemployment rate of 8.6% in 2001, with a rate of 7.6% in 2002 and a projected rate of 7.1% in 2003.⁹⁰ While it will take many years for the Czechs to establish an economy as large as the more established democracies in Europe, overall, current economic indicators are mostly positive.

In spite of the development of Czech democracy as well as a functioning market economy, the Czech military and its integration into NATO has received inconsistent support from the government and the public. While there are budgetary challenges that are holding back the reform of the Czech military, the underlying problem is rooted in the public’s perception, the priority they give their military, and their role in NATO. Historically, the Czech public perception of NATO membership was not given an opportunity to evolve. Prior to accession to the alliance in 1999, polls showed that the Czech public support for membership was among the lowest of the ten countries aspiring to membership. Polling conducted in 1997 showed that only 55-percent to 61-percent of Czechs supported entry to NATO. Instead of educating the public, Czech officials and politicians prepared, initiated, and implement the entire NATO accession process with

⁸⁸ Freedom House Country Ratings are conducted on a scale of “1” through “7”, “1” being the “most free.” Freedom House is a non-profit, non-partisan organization that promotes democracy around the world. This issue annual country rating in the areas of political rights and civil liberties for most countries. Their internet site is <http://www.freedomhouse.org/>, accessed September 18, 2003.

⁸⁹ Barney, *The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies*, 223. As is reported from *Transparency International*, an organization that compares the perception of corruption in nations around the world. Their internet site is <http://www.gwdg.de/~uwwv/2002Data.html>, accessed September 18, 2003.

⁹⁰ “Economic Readiness and Impact of NATO Membership for Central and Eastern Europe: A special Report of the Davidson Institute Emerging Market Forecasts”. The William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Business School. <http://www.wdi.bus.umich.edu/research/forecast/forecast/htm>, accessed September 9, 2003.

little public debate.⁹¹ As such, the Czech public has had a low level of knowledge regarding the responsibilities that came with membership. This was no accident. Because it was widely believed that the public had a negative impression of the military within the Czech Republic, politicians deliberately kept the NATO membership debate at a low profile so as not to irritate the public. The goal of politicians from all parties was, not to overcome the low level of public support by discussing the merits of NATO membership, but rather to join NATO by avoiding public scrutiny. As such, there was no public referendum in the Czech Republic as there was elsewhere regarding NATO membership.⁹²

Another problem was that the Czech Republic lacked the experts who could articulate a detailed understanding of the inter-workings and requirements of the NATO alliance. Whatever understanding did exist remained limited to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. These people had no reason or a mechanism for making NATO membership a subject of wider public discussion.⁹³

But a deeper reason for the lack of resources offered to the military may be the lack of interest among the Czech public and politicians toward issues of defense and security. According to polling conducted in 2000 and 2001 by Ivan Gabal, Lenka Helsusovam and Thomas Szayna regarding the Czech perception about NATO membership, 87-percent of the Czech people do not feel that the Czech Republic is externally threatened in any way.⁹⁴ Most Czechs see their NATO membership in terms of a tilt towards the West rather than a commitment to a new security alliance. Many see their NATO membership as a stepping-stone for the country's preparation to join the EU.⁹⁵ These public responses have led to questions regarding the Czech commitment to the alliance, both in and out of government, and have lead to allegations that the Czechs are "easy riders" or "free riders".⁹⁶ While polling does not support these allegations,

⁹¹ Gabal, Helsusova, and Szayna, "The Impact of NATO Membership in the Czech Republic: Changing Czech Views of Security, Military, and Defense," 2.

⁹² Ibid., 2-3.

⁹³ Ibid., 3.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 7.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 26.

⁹⁶ An "Easy Rider" is a term used in NATO related literature to describe countries that do not contribute a far share to the alliance. A "Free Rider" is a term to describe a country that contributes almost nothing to the alliance.

there are persistence questions in the minds of Czechs regarding what the alliance commitment is all about. An “us against them cold war mentality” still persists in some of the less educated parts of the population.⁹⁷ However, polling consistently shows that the majorities want the country to live up to its alliance commitments.⁹⁸ The problem comes in terms of priorities, because few feel any external threat to the Czech Republic, so it is difficult for politicians to justify allocating resources to the military against the many other competing interests important to the government.

J. CONCLUSION

The difficulties of the Czech Republic’s integration into NATO are rooted in the history of the relationship between the public and the military dating back to the Austro-Hungarian period. The military was not a significant factor, nor were they held in high esteem in the Czechoslovak nation for decades. The good news is that improvements are taking place in the public perception of their role in NATO. Efforts in the Balkans have helped the esteem and public perception of the armed forces, as well as providing a demonstration of competence and importance. A lesson to be transferred to the new round of NATO members appears to be that integration into NATO can have positive effects on the esteem, perception, and importance of the armed forces.

Achieving transformation is difficult in any military. While the Czech military has had transformation difficulties, most of these difficulties need to be classified as typical for former Warsaw Pact nations because they relate to overcoming their cold war mentality and force structure. In most former communist states, it has taken longer than expected for transformation to occur. The Czechs did not get a head start at reforms compared to others like the Polish and the Hungarians because significant repression existed in Czech society through 1989.

While it is somewhat understandable that the Czechs are having trouble formulating a consistent defense policy in view of the short amount of time they have been at it, the Czech government is consistently having problems supporting what they previously agreed to support. While the Czechs now have a very good idea of what they

⁹⁷ Gabal, Helsusova, and Szayna, “The Impact of NATO Membership in the Czech Republic: Changing Czech Views of Security, Military, and Defense,” 43-44.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 53-54.

want to accomplish and why, they are far from filling in the details and are having trouble following through with funding the military transformation. Issues like the development of a professional army, an NCO corps, the development of a training infrastructure and curriculum, human resource marketing models, promotion criteria, and the many other aspects of building a new infrastructure are just now being developed. The manner in which they are proceeding is appropriate as outlined by the recent review conducted by General Schroeder. However, Schroeder sees correctly that the historical problem has been funding and following through – not the plan itself. Nevertheless, Schroeder does not let the military off the hook. He subtly notes that the military cannot just blame civilians. The military has the responsibility to market itself in Czech society, making its own importance and contributions known. It is up to the Defense Ministry to make its own case for the appropriate portion of the national assets, in addition to spending those assets appropriately.

Morale problems are typical of any large bureaucracy that is reducing its workforce. The Czech Army is no exception. While there is nothing published regarding how well the Czechs are managing their military drawdown process compared to others, morale has reportedly been low in the Czech army since the early 1990s. In any bureaucracy with a limited budget where a drawdown is taking place more quickly than on an attritional basis, the reduction process will be painful. It is difficult to believe that morale will improve much before the process is complete. Again, problems associated with the reductions in the size of the Czech army are found in many NATO countries since the Cold War, including the United States.

Problems with the Military Intelligence Services of former Warsaw Pact nations, including Romania and elsewhere, are not new. The recent problems reported in the Czech Republic's Defense Intelligence Service are surprising, only because they did not get greater attention at an earlier time period. The fact that the Czechs have decided to disband defense intelligence and start over reflects that they feel that little can be salvaged from their current system.

The Czech insistence to bear the expense to protect their own airspace, in view of the general reluctance to spend on their military in general, remains an interesting one. Although NATO authorities have tried to convince the Czechs that the airspace could be

secured by other alliance members at a more economical rate, Czech leaders have apparently decided that there is a limit to trusting their security to the alliance. This is counter to the Czech desire to take part in the European Common Market and accept the European Common Currency – steps that might seem to some as a greater sovereignty divestment. This decision does provide an indicator of the strong persistence of a Czech national identity and is certainly consistent with the rest of central Europe.

Probably the most important lesson that can be taken from the Czech experience is in the area of civil-military relations. The public was uninvolved and disinterested in the decision to seek membership in NATO, nor did politicians make an effort to involve them. Ironically, most of the problems that the Czech Military has confronted have been rooted in a lack of public interest, understanding and support. Ultimately, it is the taxpayers in the candidate countries that need to make good on the commitments that accession to NATO represents. As in the Czech case, when taxpayers are neither consulted on their views on accession, nor informed properly about the costs of alliance integration, both the quality of the accessants membership is damaged and NATO has to deal with security shortcomings that are potentially damaging to its operations.⁹⁹ The Czech Republic clearly demonstrates why public perceptions are an important matter to the military. Ultimately, it shows that it is the public who controls the military.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 56.

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III. INTEGRATION OF HUNGARY INTO NATO

How has NATO profited by adding Hungary to the alliance? On the positive side, NATO has one of the leaders of postcommunist democratization and economic transition in central Europe.¹⁰⁰ Hungary has already proven its geographical worth by acting as a staging area for both the SFOR and KFOR operations in the Balkans since 1996. However, on the negative side, the Hungarian Defense Force (HDF) remains in a beaten and pathetic state. Post-Communist Hungary inherited a military establishment that had been prepared and outfitted as part of the Warsaw Pact's offensive doctrine. The HDF has remained greatly under funded and inadequately equipped. Pay in the armed forces is inadequate, and moral has been horrible for decades. The prestige of the military profession in Hungary has been among the lowest in the region. Since at least 1948 when Hungary came under Soviet influence, the army has been held in low esteem, and the financial outlays necessary to change things drastically have not won support.¹⁰¹

On the political front, a senior figure in European security recently remarked that "Hungary has won the prize for the most disappointing new member of NATO," citing allegations of anti-Semitism, extraterritorial claims against neighbors, a reactionary view of military reform, and a failure to play a constructive role in Balkan security.¹⁰² Any understanding of these comments lay in understanding the bitter hand that Hungarians feel history has dealt them. It and reminds them that the Hungarian armed forces, hampered by a vulnerable geography, have almost never been successful on the field of battle. Following the Austro-Hungarian collapse in the wake of defeat after the First World War, the new government was forced to sign the Trianon Peace Treaty in 1920, effectively divesting the country of 70-percent of its former land, one-third if its population, and all of its raw materials. Although not Fascist, the Hungarian government initially sided with Hitler during the Second World War in hopes of regaining lost territory. This endeavor ultimately failed entirely and Hungarian territory became a

¹⁰⁰ Zoltan Barany, "Hungary: An Outpost on the Troubled Periphery," *America's New Allies: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO*, Andrew Michta, editor (London: University of Washington Press, 1999), 106.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 107.

¹⁰² Wallander, "NATO's Price – Shape Up or Ship Out," *Foreign Affairs*, December 1, 2002.

battleground for offenses against the Nazis.¹⁰³ Some have accused the conservative government of Prime Minister Victor Orbán of having nationalist leanings and igniting underlying Hungarian bitterness. However, it is hoped that the reignition of these feelings has been laid dormant with the recent defeat of the Orbán government in 2002.

In the introduction to the new Defense Review, published August 11, 2003, Defense Minister Ferenc Juhász is brutally frank about the current state of the Hungarian military. Juhász states, “The constant reforms and reorganizations of the HDF of the past twenty years have caused a downward spiral of serial failures by the armed forces...”.¹⁰⁴ He also stated that Hungary is so far from meeting its commitments to NATO that it “...would have been expelled if there were a mechanism for expulsion in place.”¹⁰⁵ He notes that the HDF has had a difficult time finding their place in society and in making a meaningful contribution to the alliance. He bluntly claims that the armed forces have not made good use of the hundreds of billions of taxpayer’s money they have received. He indicates that this is because of short sightedness that has caused the military to continue to prepare for a 20th century war -- a war that will never be fought in the 21st century. Juhász notes that Hungary continues to believe that its future stability and security will best be guaranteed through membership in NATO, which it joined in 1999, and the EU, which it intends to join in 2004. However, it appears that once NATO membership was achieved, reform stagnated.¹⁰⁶

A. PUBLIC AND POLITICAL SUPPORT

First articulated in a 1990 speech by then foreign minister Gyula Horn, Hungary was the first former Warsaw Pact nation to speculate about the plausibility to become a

¹⁰³ Janos Szabó, “Transforming the Defense Sector in a New Democracy - Hungary,” *Military and Society in 21st Century Europe: A Comparative Analysis*, Jürgen Kuhlmann and Jean Callaghan, Eds., George C. Marshall European Center (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2001), 115.

¹⁰⁴ Introduction by Ferenc Juhász, Minister of Defense, to “Shaping an Armed Forces for the 21st Century,” *Hungarian Defense Mirror*, Honvedelmi Miniszterium, August 11, 2003, 4. Internet Site <http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk.php=13869>, accessed September 25, 2003.

¹⁰⁵ Barany, *The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies*, 28.

¹⁰⁶ “Defense, Executive Summary: Hungary,” *Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments – The Balkans*, Jane’s, February 11, 2003, internet site http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/balksu/hungs010.htm@current&QueryText=n ull&Prod_Name=BALKSU&image=browse&#section3, accessed September 27, 2003.

member of NATO.¹⁰⁷ Afterwards, the campaign for NATO membership was decidedly elite-driven and has been supported by all the major political parties. The campaign paid off. In November of 1997, 85-percent of Hungarians voted in a referendum in favor of membership in NATO.¹⁰⁸

In spite of the recognition in Hungary of the value of security the NATO referendum demonstrates, the military has not quickly lost its negative legacy because of it. However, there is some polling evidence that would seem to indicate that the traditional public view of the military is slowly changing with NATO membership and that the public has been receptive to recent defense reforms. A Gallup poll conducted in February of 2000 reported that 61-percent of the public was supportive of greater spending for military reform, although not if it would mean raising taxes. 81-percent were supportive of the reexamination of strategy in hopes of more effective armed forces. A Gallup poll conducted the previous November suggested that the armed forces had restored their public image. The armed forces ranked fourth on a list of institutions that had the public confidence followed by the president, the border patrol, and the Constitutional Court (see Table 1). They also ranked number four out of Hungarian institutions to which the public was willing to give their tax money.¹⁰⁹ But while trust in the military has risen, confidence has not. From September of 1991 to September of 2000, the public's confidence in the military dropped from 66-percent to 42-percent.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ Zoltan Barany, "Hungary: An Outpost on the Troubled Periphery," 74.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 86-88.

¹⁰⁹ "Hungary: Many Generals, Officers can expect Sack, Public for Army Reform – Poll," *MTI News Agency*, February 3, 2000, Budapest, BBC Worldwide Monitoring.

¹¹⁰ Pál Dunay, "The Armed Forces in the Hungarian Society: Finding a Role?," 11.

Table 1. The Change in Public Confidence in Institutions ¹¹¹
From Median Public Opinion and Marketing Co. Ltd.

[averages on a scale of 100; 1 = no confidence at all; 100 = full confidence]

	<i>Sep-91</i>	<i>Jan-92</i>	<i>Oct-93</i>	<i>Jul-94</i>	<i>Apr-96</i>	<i>Nov-98</i>	<i>Oct-99</i>	<i>Sep-00</i>
President of the Rep.	79	-	61	80	70	72	74	68
Constitutional Court	68	-	50	65	65	71	67	67
Courts	73	53	49	59	50	54	53	53
Armed Forces	66	52	53	62	55	55	51	42
Churches	61	56	-	-	45	43	47	42
Police	64	-	51	59	54	61	41	45
Local Government	61	53	47	56	52	54	56	54
Government	57	43	29	63	42	50	42	42
Parliament	57	33	30	58	38	48	42	43
Trade Unions	39	-	33	39	30	31	27	28
Parties	37	-	26	43	31	38	36	35

Source: J. Eszényi, A honvédség iránti lakossági bizalom tíz éve /Ten years of public confidence towards the Home Defense Forces/ , Új Honvédség Szemle, no. 5 (2001) 29.

In spite of the public's warming trust in the military, there is very little interest in defense matters. As in most of Europe, this is probably because the public sees no imminent military threats to Hungarian territory in the foreseeable future. General threat perceptions have changed in two ways. First, threats perceived by the public are moving

¹¹¹ Ibid., 11-12.

away from military ones to an increasing emphasis on problems such as organized crime and illegal migration. Second, the conclusion of the Yugoslav wars and the demise of Milosevic in 2000 removed what was seen as the main military threat to Hungarian security.¹¹² As a result, there are no known security threats and the idea of collective security may seem to be a bit nebulous to the public.

In addition to the lack of public interest in national defense, the lack of an obvious external threat is allowing politicians to play politics with the military. There are great differences between the political parties regarding the method and timing of defense reform, being driven primarily for the purpose of political posturing. There remains the danger that the political establishment will continue to use the defense sector as a playground for experimentation and rhetorical gain, thinking that there are no political costs for doing so.¹¹³

Interestingly, the lack of interest in defense issues does not appear to be due to weak institutions or an especially poor economy by Central European standards. Considering the tremendous institutional shift that was required after the fall of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, Hungary has had few bumps in developing what appears to be a stable democracy and a working market economy in less than a decade. Like the Czech Republic, Hungary's "Freedom House" scores are both excellent, listed as a "1" on the Human Rights scale and a "2" on the Civil Liberties scale consistently from 1993 through 2000.¹¹⁴ Hungary does appear to have less corruption than either Poland or the Czech Republic in addition to most other former Warsaw Pact countries with a rating of 4.9 on the corruption perception index in 2002, based on surveys conducted by Transparency International.¹¹⁵ The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth has been running right at 3.2 percent through 2003 and is projected to grow and be around 4.4 percent through 2004. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is

¹¹² Pál Dunay, "Geneva Center for Security Policy," a synopsis of his presentation given as part of a conference "The Armed Forces and Society in Postcommunist Europe: Legitimacy and Change," held at Lake Bled in Slovenia, 14-17 March 2002. Internet site <http://www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/GRC/CMR/TCMR%20Papers/TCMR%201.14.htm>, accessed October 3, 2003.

¹¹³ Pál Dunay, "The Armed Forces in the Hungarian Society: Finding a role?," 10.

¹¹⁴ Freedom House Country Ratings, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/>, accessed September 18, 2003.

¹¹⁵ Barney, *The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies*, 223. As is reported from *Transparency International*, an organization that compares the perception of corruption in nations around the world. Their internet site is <http://www.gwdg.de/~uwwv/2002Data.html>, accessed September 18, 2003.

projected to increase a moderate 4.7 percent in 2003 and 4.4 percent in 2004. Unemployment has been running at 6.2 percent, which is well below average by Central European standards.¹¹⁶

Meeting NATO's criteria of achieving democracy and a market economy was perhaps easier for Hungary compared to other former Warsaw Pact states because they had the great fortune of having a significant "post-totalitarian" warm up period. As such, its transition to Western style parliamentary democracy was the first and the smoothest among the former Soviet bloc nations, inspired by ingrained nationalism that encouraged Hungarians to control their own destiny.¹¹⁷ Although Hungary had no social movements comparable to Solidarity in Poland or street demonstrations of the magnitude found in Czechoslovakia, an enlightened leadership softened the Soviet political constraints to the extent possible immediately after the attempted 1956 revolution. By 1987, a large number of self-organized associational groups emerged in Hungarian society, showing that Hungarians could tolerate a significant amount of diversity by Warsaw Pact standards.¹¹⁸ The Soviet Economic constraints were liberalized to the extent possible as well. This was led by the "New Economic Mechanism," started in 1968, that represented the most pervasive experimentation of any Warsaw Pact country with markets and quasi-private property. It initially reopened Hungary to foreign trade, gave limited freedom to the market, and allowed a number of small businesses to operate in the service sector.¹¹⁹ As evidence of this, 55-percent of all new housing in Hungary was constructed by this "secondary" economy and was open to private purchase and ownership.¹²⁰ This carried through the end of the communist regime and made the transition to democracy and a market economy much easier by 1989.

¹¹⁶ "Davidson Institute Emerging Markets Forecasts (DIEM F): Quarterly Economic Forecasts for Central and Eastern Europe," William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan, July 15, 2003.

¹¹⁷ "Background note: Hungary," Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, July 2002, internet site <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2852.htm>, accessed September 26, 2003.

¹¹⁸ Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 300-301.

¹¹⁹ "Background note: Hungary," Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, July 2002, internet site <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2852.htm>, accessed September 26, 2003.

¹²⁰ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, 298.

B. OBSTACLES TO INTEGRATION

As mentioned, Hungarian's do not historically have a positive military heritage and Hungarian society has not traditionally held its armed forces in high esteem. The military has too often been seen as the evil arm of authoritarian regimes, including both fascist regimes in World War II and communist regimes through the 1980s. The Hungarians have too often historically found themselves on the wrong side of a losing cause. The army is reputed by some to have lost every war from 1487 through the communist era ending in 1989. It was last charged to defend the nation against the overwhelming Soviet invasion in 1956, which, of course, it could not do.¹²¹ It is these memories that underlie the problems Hungary is having in meeting its commitments to NATO.

Unlike Poland, Hungary has a history of civilian control of the military. While this characteristic is often described as a positive in other places, in Hungary, it is sometimes seen as a negative because of the degree of dominance civilians have maintained over the military. Far from any concern the military might meddle in politics, the long history of civilian dominance has been a detriment to military effectiveness.¹²² Too often throughout the 1990s, politicians made political decisions regarding the military without consultation as to the ramifications with military experts.¹²³ This politicization of defense issues has caused constant course reversals, such as which air bases to keep open, whether to refurbish MiG-29s, and whether to lease Gripen fighters.¹²⁴ The fact that Hungary is the only country within NATO that requires a two-thirds majority in parliament to send its troops abroad has also caused some concerns. For example, Foreign Minister Janos Martonyi and others have called for Hungary to have a new national security strategy, which would allow the cabinet to act on its own in emergency situations.¹²⁵

¹²¹ Pál Dunay, "The Armed Forces in the Hungarian Society: Finding a Role?," Chapter 5 of *Transforming Postcommunist Militaries: Professionalization of the Armed Forces in Central and Eastern Europe*, University of Bristol, 2001, internet site <http://www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/GRC/CMR/TCMR%20Papers/hungarian.pdf>, accessed October 3, 2003, 1.

¹²² Simon, *NATO Enlargement and Central Europe: A Study in Civil Military Relations*, 89.

¹²³ Ibid., 3.

¹²⁴ Jeffrey Simon, *Hungary and NATO: Problems In Civil-Military Relations*. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 94.

¹²⁵ "Defense, Executive Summary: Hungary," *Janes Sentinel Security Assessments - Balkans*, February 11, 2003

Following their formal accession to NATO, many members of the Hungarian government remain worried that the restructure of the country's military has failed to progress at the desired speed due to the pursuit of the wrong priorities. The Hungarian cabinet, responding to allegations that soldier's living standards have reached a critical low, now accept the fact that the past military reorganization attempts have failed in many respects. Certainly, U.S. General Joseph Ralston, the head of EUCOM, and Secretary-General Lord George Robertson, have both echoed this concern.¹²⁶ While pursuing the wrong priorities is a factor, a lack of military appropriations appears to be the major culprit cited for these shortcomings. For both reasons, progress has been extremely slow. Accordingly, the government has now stipulated a new, more realistic, 10-year deadline for Hungarian forces to come up to NATO standards.¹²⁷

While it appears that conscription will be phased out at some point, training continues for conscripts and newly recruited contract soldiers. Unfortunately, training takes place against a background of an increasing number of resignations of regular officers and NCOs because of low pay, poor housing and declining social status. As a result, the quality of training suffers. Continuity and expertise in the armed forces continues to be a problem.¹²⁸

While it has now been more than twelve years since the end of the demise of the Warsaw Pact, structural and doctrinal differences with NATO remain.¹²⁹ A major problem lies in the national defense planning process. It is still not fully interoperable with the process used by NATO, meaning that Hungary must continue to maintain two parallel processes. Defense planning lacks sufficient depth or detail. For instance, in the defense transformation and downsizing, cuts were made without careful consideration regarding the impact of these cuts, sometimes rendering units entirely ineffective. As is an inherent problem with downsizing militaries, staffs at central headquarters were often protected and, in some cases, actually increased in order to protect some of those whose

¹²⁶ "NATO Commander Urges Faster Hungarian Military Reform," *Budapest, International News*, October 25, 2000, Agence France Presse; and "The Weakest Link," *Washington Post*, November 5, 2002.

¹²⁷ "Defense, Executive Summary, Hungary," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessments - Balkans*.

¹²⁸ Jeffrey Simon, *Hungary and NATO: Problems In Civil-Military Relations*, 99-100.

¹²⁹ "Foreign Policy," Government Portal, Hungary.HU, Internet site <http://www.ekormanyzat.hu/english?kateg=english:1321>, accessed 24 July 03.

jobs were being eliminated in the field.¹³⁰ As in the Czech Republic and elsewhere, constant downsizing is often difficult for those in the military to accept.

Another defense planning problem is the way plans are budgeted by the parliament. The execution of long-range plans cannot be assured because the funding of plans is handled from year to year. As a result, the Ministry of Defense may start a costly program but may need to greatly cut the original concept due to funding shortfalls and may not finish the program at all.¹³¹

As in the Czech Republic, there has been significant debate between the Hungarians and NATO planners as to whether Hungary needs to control its own airspace. The issue became controversial during the mid-1990s when aircraft from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia violated Hungarian airspace. During the Kosovo crisis in the late 1990s, there was public discontent over the need for aircraft from other nations to patrol Hungarian airspace. NATO planners have told the Hungarian government that the alliance air-defense umbrella makes the acquisition of supersonic fighters unnecessary. They suggest that the limited funds would be better spent on more basic acquisitions, upgrades and reforms. However, the country's history leaves its electorate and political class broadly convinced that the country's air force must be able to mount a robust defense of its sovereign airspace. The national defense continues to direct that the air defense and air force units will possess the facilities and power necessary to control and defend the country's airspace, to protect the major installations, and to provide the aerial support required by defensive activities.¹³²

In spite of Hungary's insistence that they will control their own airspace, pilot training has been a constant problem. Hungarian pilots fly only an average of between 50 to 75 hours per year due to funding. By comparison, American pilots consider 100 hours flying time a year as a dangerously low amount to maintain proficiency. In spite of this,

¹³⁰ Babos, Tibor, "Stumbling Block's of Hungary's NATO Integration," Defense Studies, Budapest, Institute of Strategic and Defense Research, 2001, 66-67.

¹³¹ Ibid., 67.

¹³² "Air Force: Hungary", *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessments – The Balkans*, Jane's, February 11, 2003, Internet site http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp?K2DocKey=%2Fcontent1%2Fjanesdata%2Fsent%2Fbalksu%2Fhung120.htm@current&Prod_Name=BALKSU&, accessed September 27, 2003.

except for the thirty Hungarian MiG-29 pilots assigned to NATO, this situation appears likely to persist for most pilots for the foreseeable future.¹³³

Since NATO membership became a reality, the Hungarians have had to constantly reassess and scale back their target goals, primarily because of a lack of funding. Prior to being accepted into the alliance, the Hungarian's had promised to meet 14 of its 48 target goals towards their acceptance into the alliance. By the time membership was achieved in 1999, only six of these goals were met and the Hungarians were still working on the others. By the end of 2003, it is estimated that Hungary will only meet 23 of these goals.¹³⁴ Hungary has continued to struggle with routine NATO integration challenges. For example, English sufficiency, one of the two languages used by NATO, has been a shortcoming. Also, the development of secure telecommunications, computer, and data systems has been a problem. While these problems are slowly being addressed, they still exist.¹³⁵

Underlying all of the challenges of Hungary's integration into NATO is its military budget. In spite of military commanders repeatedly announcing that it would be impossible to maintain the country's defenses with the meager resources allocated to them, defense budgets shrank from 3.5-percent of GDP in 1988 to a low of 1.4 in 1998. There has been only a little improvement since. In view of a lack of public concern about defense issues and the fact that the Hungarian's have lacked an effective defense lobby, reducing defense budgets has been good politics. While military budgets have improved modestly, the Hungarian Defense Force (HDF) remains totally impoverished.¹³⁶

C. MILITARY APPROPRIATIONS

Even before it became an alliance member, NATO has consistently criticized Budapest for its low level of military expenditure and its failure to fulfill pledges involving spending increases. As mentioned, during the late 1990s, Hungary's military spending dipped as low as 1.4-percent of GDP in 1998 – not nearly enough to facilitate

¹³³ Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Foster, "Military Matters: Beyond Prague," *NATO Review*, NATO, Autumn 2002, internet site <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue3/english/military.html>, accessed September 25, 2003; Jeffrey Simon, *Hungary and NATO: Problems In Civil-Military Relations*, 57-58, 81.

¹³⁴ "Integrating New Allies into NATO," *CBO Paper*, 17-18.

¹³⁵ Babos, Tibor, "Stumbling Block's of Hungary's NATO Integration, *Defense Studies*," 70.

¹³⁶ Zoltan Barany, "Hungary: An Outpost on the Troubled Periphery," 96.

the military transformation needed to achieve NATO integration.¹³⁷ In 1999, spending was raised to only 1.6-percent of GDP during the time it was attempting to gain NATO membership.¹³⁸ In real terms, from 1996 through the year 2000, annual defense spending fluctuated between \$660-million (U.S.) to \$698-million (U.S.) - a reflection of just how small the GDP is in postcommunist countries compared to established European democracies. When Hungary acceded to NATO in 1999, through negotiation, it took on a firm commitment to increase its defense spending one percent each year to reach the level of 1.81-percent of its GDP. While this was under the 2.0-percent of GDP NATO was requesting from its other new entrants, Hungary immediately fell behind this lower pledge amount. The actual amount spent was reduced in 2000 to only 1.51-percent.¹³⁹ Since then, Hungary has continued to under perform its military appropriations goals. For instance, in 2002, defense spending only reached the level of 1.6-percent of GDP. Defense Minister Ferenc Juhász recently announced that the government has now promised to increase defense spending to the level of 2.0-percent of GDP by 2006.¹⁴⁰ However, based on past performance, it would be difficult to rely on Hungary's pledge to meet this goal.

Making Hungary's promise even more difficult for the alliance, the fiscal approach that dominated NATO's first eastward enlargement was flawed. It did not identify capability improvement projects at an early stage, and as a consequence, the defense budget could increase without actually making improvements to the performance of the Hungarian armed forces.¹⁴¹ This was arguably happening in Hungary where most of the funds continued to flow into supersonic aircraft and military salaries due to Hungary's insistence to control its own airspace as well as outdated units and personnel structures. Spending in this fashion had little to do with supporting NATO requirements.

Arguably, Hungary's recent low percentage of defense spending is not because the economy is weaker than other economies in Central Europe. In fact, Hungary's

¹³⁷ SIPRI Yearbook, 2000, as reported by Szayna, "NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping," 59.

¹³⁸ "Integrating New Allies into NATO," *CBO Paper*, Congressional Budget Office, 8-9.

¹³⁹ Jeffrey Simon, Transforming the Armed Forces of Central and Eastern Europe, *Strategic Forum*, No. 172, June 2000, 1.

¹⁴⁰ "Executive Summary: Hungary," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – The Balkans*.

¹⁴¹ Pal Dunay, "The Armed Forces in the Hungarian Society: Finding a Role?," 15.

economy is better prepared than most for EU membership. It has strong growth rates of 5.15-percent in 2000 and 3.8-percent in 2001, as well as unemployment at a reasonable level of around 6.0-percent of the labor force. Foreign direct investment is also high, reaching \$2.1-billion (U.S.) in 2001.¹⁴² The Governor of the Hungarian National Bank deemed the country's economy strong enough for all restrictions to be lifted from the Hungarian forint (HUF). By June 2001, the HUF had become fully convertible. The move was in line with Hungary's intention to join the European Monetary Union (EMU) membership in 2006. However, like the Czech Republic, they are being held back due to a continuing large public budget deficit of 9.9-percent of GDP in 2002. While the deficit is improving, Hungary does have a long way to go in order to enter the EMU on schedule. Like the Czechs, the existence of the deficit along with the desire to join the EMU will likely continue to cause politicians to avoid providing the full allotment of spending promised to the military.¹⁴³

D. PLANS FOR REFORM

The most recent Hungarian Defense Review was initiated in 2002 and was published August 11, 2003. The objective of the review was to:

...redefine the function and tasks of the Hungarian Defense Forces in compliance with the significant changed international situation and NATO concepts as well as the national interests and goals, identify and prioritize the necessary capabilities and make proposals to allocate resources to such capabilities.¹⁴⁴

It reflects the fact that the Hungarian's feel they now face no foreseeable strategic or territorial threats other than terrorism. Beyond territorial security, Hungary's entire plan is centered on integration with the current NATO strategic plans. Officials acknowledge that their past promises to NATO were not realistic and therefore not

¹⁴² "Economy: Hungary," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – The Balkans*, Janes February 11, 2003, Internet site http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/entinel/BALK_doc_view.jsp?Sent_Country=Hungary&, accessed September 27, 2003.

¹⁴³ "Main Economic Indicators: Hungary," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – The Balkans*, Jane's, February 11, 2003, Internet site http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp?K2DocKey=%2Fcontent1%2Fjanesdata%2Fsent%2Fbalksu%2Fhung170.htm@current&Prod_Name=BALKSU&, accessed September 27, 2003.

¹⁴⁴ "Shaping an Armed Forces for the 21st Century," *Hungarian Defense Mirror*, 4.

carried out. They also recognize that “Maintaining the present structure of ...[Hungarian] defense forces is impossible...” as well as pointless, even if financial sources were increased.¹⁴⁵ In order to pay for the changes that are necessary, the reduction of the armed forces is a key element to the success of the reorganization program. To date, forces have been cut by more than 200-percent since 1989 and the reductions are continuing.¹⁴⁶ However, closing outdated barracks and renovating facilities that will not continue to be used is also an important part of the plan.¹⁴⁷ Unfortunately, because of funding deficiencies, barracks renovation and quality of life improvements have been slow.

In his introduction to the 2003 Defense Review, Defense Minister Ferenc Juhász acknowledges a greatly changing security environment since the last review that was conducted in the 1999-2000 time frame. The review not only includes post September 11th considerations, but also integrates the “Prague Capability Commitments” Hungary made at the recent Prague conference in November 2002. However, unlike previous reviews, this one claims to have been completed more carefully and is more in line with projected defense budgets. New initiatives include the introduction of modern protective equipment against chemical and biological weapons, integration into the development of the alliance surveillance system, the development of transportation capabilities, and modernization of the Hungarian logistics capability. Recent NATO experience is showing that Special Forces are playing a greater role. This realization is built into the Defense Review as well.¹⁴⁸

As it considered its recent Defense Review, Hungary has had to face the fact that few but the largest states are able to secure funding to maintain the spectrum of capabilities typical of the Cold War. Because if this, Hungary is participating in the shared task specialization with other European NATO members. In view of their funding level, maintaining a stand-alone modern military capability is no longer an option for most member states.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 4.

¹⁴⁶ “Defense, Summary, Hungary,” *Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – the Balkans*.

¹⁴⁷ “Shaping An Armed Forces for the 21st Century,” *Hungarian Defense Mirror*, 9.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 6.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 7.

Much of the redesign of the Hungarian armed forces is aimed at the current alliance terrorist threat. In the wake of the September 11th attacks in the United States, the Hungarian parliament responded to United States requests and approved national anti-terrorism legislation authorizing the imposition of an embargo on any state, organization, or individual suspected of terrorism.¹⁵⁰ Hungary has been on an increased state of alert since the terrorist attacks in the United States. Amongst other measures, the National Security Cabinet has sanctioned increased protection for the Paks nuclear power plant in Hungary, and preparations are underway to develop the capability to counter biological attacks. The Hungarian parliament overwhelmingly approved a resolution for increased internal and external security measures, with some \$68-million (U.S.) having already been set aside.

Another core task outlined in the Defense Review is the need to perform peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions in concert with other forces around the world, both as part of NATO and in other scenarios. In this regard, the Hungarian's are proposing that they specialize in engineering functions including bridge building and water supply as well as military policing. The Hungarian army has recently shown its expertise in bridge building functions during SFOR.¹⁵¹

In meeting the current challenge efficiently, the Hungarians realize that they require flexible armed forces that can be used within the entire spectrum of national and allied tasks, from warfighting to peacekeeping. This flexibility is the only cost effective way to achieve the goals they desire. As such, each element of their military must be able to perform various functions. Additionally, Hungary realizes that it needs light, mobile and deployable land forces to take part in Article 6 "out-of-area" missions as they are required. Developing strategic transportation capabilities and a solid combat support capacity are pre-requisites to deploying forces on a regular basis. Additionally, Hungary needs to gradually enter into service up-to-date military technical equipment to achieve a higher level of interoperability with others in the Alliance. This means a modern, mobile and secure command, communications and information capability.

¹⁵⁰ "USA to Ask Hungary to Aid War on Terrorism," *Nepszava Web Site*, Budapest September 6, 2002, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Worldwide Monitoring.

¹⁵¹ "Shaping An Armed Forces for the 21st Century," *Hungarian Defense Mirror*, 9.

Another theme of the Defense Review is the fact that the need for armored capabilities, a component of the Warsaw Pact force structure, is greatly decreasing because the threat of a ground attack has become almost nil. This includes fixed, non-deployable command elements. This equipment is not interoperable and is entirely outdated. Though Hungarians have been reluctant to part with this equipment, they now see that maintaining it requires scarce financial and human resources with little positive gain in terms of a modern defense capability. Instead, all efforts are being put into collective defense for any residual ground attack threat.

Hungary's emphasis on integration training with other Western militaries seems to be paying off. Prior to joining NATO, between 1990 and 1996, more than 800 Hungarian Army personnel were sent to NATO nations for training. This number has accelerated since. The US, France, Germany and the UK are continuing to give technical training in numerous areas related to alliance integration by way of visiting teams and offering places in their own national military education programs.¹⁵² The results of working with more advanced militaries seem to be paying off in terms of Hungary's military expertise.

E. FORCE RESTRUCTURING

Like all the Defense Forces of the former Warsaw Pact as well as most of the more mature NATO members, the Hungarians have long been greatly reducing their overall force structure. At its height in 1989, the HDF boasted 155,700 men.¹⁵³ Constant downsizing has reduced that number to 45,000 members, including civilians, in 2002. By 2006, the overall number of forces is expected to total of 35,000, including 5000 civilians. By 2013, the total forces are projected to be 30,000 including only 3,500 civilians.¹⁵⁴ To meet these numbers, many previous functions provided by the military will need to be outsourced to the private sector. The downsizing process is projected to continue until at least 2013 when the entire Hungarian military will be reduced to around 30,000 including civilians (see Table 2).

¹⁵² "Defense, Executive Summary: Hungary" *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – The Balkans*.

¹⁵³ Barney, "Hungary: An Outpost on the Troubled Periphery," 99.

¹⁵⁴ "Shaping an Armed Forces for the 21st Century," *Hungarian Defense Mirror*, 17.

Table 2. Expected Phases of Downsizing (From¹⁵⁵)

By 2006	HDF 30 thousand, MoD and background institutes 5 thousand (Total 35 thousand)
By 2010	HDF 28 thousand, MoD and background institutes 4 thousand (Total 32 thousand)
By 2013	HDF 26.5 thousand, MoD and background institutes 3.5 thousand (Total 30 thousand)

Along with the downsizing effort, major alterations in the force structure are necessary. The recent Defense Review highlights the need for better trained, better motivated, more experienced soldiers in order to meet current NATO tasking. First, like all of the former Warsaw Pact countries, the Hungarian's are still trying to solve their "reverse pyramid" problem in their leadership ranks. This means that they continue to have too many officers in the higher ranks and a deficiency of lower ranking officers as well as professional NCOs. While the number of officers has dropped from 17,800 in 1989 to 8,850 in 2002, this reduction is not consistent with the decrease in the total number of forces. Not only do too many officers remain in the current force structure, but there are too many high ranking officers and not enough junior officers.¹⁵⁶ This total remains in spite of extreme efforts like the forced retirement of all officers above the age of 55 years old in the mid 1990s. Steps continue to be taken to rectify the problem. For instance, the Ministry and the Defense Staff decreased their leadership personnel by around 20-percent in 2003. However, further leadership downsizing is still required.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁵ "Defense, Executive Summary: Hungary" *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessments – The Balkans*.

¹⁵⁶ Jeffrey Simon, *Hungary and NATO: Problems In Civil-Military Relations*, 99.

¹⁵⁷ Barney, "Hungary: An Outpost on the Troubled Periphery," 100.

Second, like in most of the former Warsaw Pact nations, an increase in the numbers and qualifications of senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) is necessary to fulfill the requirements of a military force in the Western tradition. Higher pay and better training will be necessary to attract the quality of professional Senior NCOs necessary. The HDF has already made great strides in this direction. The number of Senior NCOs was increased from 2,700 in late 1997 to 5,000 by the year 2000. As part of its deepening relations with NATO, Hungary has also signed a military training co-operation agreement with Turkey to help train its growing NCO corps. NCO pay range has also improved and now reflects the national average wage.¹⁵⁸

Table 3. Changes in the Hungarian Defense Forces (From ¹⁵⁹)						
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	% change
<i>Officers</i>	11,217	11,350	9,800	9,113	8,850	-21.1
<i>NCOs</i>	10,295	11,200	9,350	10,274	10,378	0.8
<i>Contract soldiers</i>	5,000	5,330	7,000	6,348	6,850	37
<i>Civilian employees</i>	13,593	11,880	11,996	7,566	5,865	-58.2
<i>Conscripts</i>	21,026	19,735	16,918	11,802	11,080	-47.3
<i>Cadets etc</i>	2,330	2,005	2,005	2,065	2,065	-12.6
<i>Total</i>	63,461	61,500	57,069	47,168	45,088	-29

Hungarians have always had a large conscript force, which provided a way to keep society in contact with the armed forces. The conscript force has dropped drastically to around 11,000 but still remains the largest part of the force. In response to the current distaste among the Hungarian population towards conscript service, primarily because of the horrible conditions conscripts have had to endure in recent years, the parliament has reduced the amount of time a conscript must serve from nine months to

¹⁵⁸ Army: Hungary, *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessments – The Balkans*, Jane's, February 11, 2003, Internet site http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp?K2DocKey=%2Fcontent1%2Fjanesdata%2Fsent%2Fbalksu%2Fhung110.htm@current&Prod_Name=BALKSU&, accessed September 27, 2003.

¹⁵⁹ "Defense, Executive Summary: Hungary" *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - The Balkans*.

six months as of January 1, 2002.¹⁶⁰ While it is difficult to believe that conscripts serving for this short period of time could possibly be effective as soldiers, the service reduction will have the positive effect of continuing to whittle down the total number of conscripts.

Whether to continue conscript service at all has been a hot topic in Hungary for several years. Under the prior conservative government lead by Victor Orbán, it was argued that conscript service gave the population an opportunity to provide national service and promoted good civil-military relations. The Orbán administration argued that if there was an all-professional military, the concept of national service would disappear and the military would lose even more support due to public disinterest. However, it is suggested by others that these disadvantages can be overcome with the greater public esteem that would be given to those who serve in a professional military. Outside the government of former Prime Minister Victor Orbán, mandatory conscription service has been deeply unpopular in Hungary for some time and the overwhelming weight of public opinion was in favor of its abolition.

With the Socialist Party victory in April of 2002, it has now been decided that compulsory military service will finally be eliminated in the near future.¹⁶¹ Coming to the same conclusion as other 1999 NATO entrants and PfP partners but a little later, Hungarians have now formally concluded that an involuntary conscript force no longer has any capabilities that will help meet future military obligations. Like most alliance members, the Hungarian's now believe that only career professionals can handle modern missions. Modern forces must be able to be mobilized quickly, be deployable, and be specialized – requirements that a revolving conscript pool cannot meet consistently. Final plans are now being put into place to develop an all-voluntary professional force by 2006, though it will probably take years longer. Though the Hungarian leadership realizes that they will have higher overall personnel salary expenses, they project that, in balance, the force will be more cost effective due to lower costs for preparation, training, maintenance, and repair of equipment.¹⁶² This 'course correction' probably has

¹⁶⁰Jeffrey Simon, *Hungary and NATO: Problems In Civil-Military Relations*, 99.

¹⁶¹ Pál Dunay, "The Armed Forces in the Hungarian Society: Finding a Role?," 9.

¹⁶² "Shaping an Armed Forces for the 21st Century," *Hungarian Defense Mirror*, 17.

everything to do with public demand since, during the 1990s, professionalization of the military was considered too expensive.¹⁶³ The Defense Ministry has now established new force structure target percentages that they hope to achieve by 2006 in order to facilitate the new professional force (Table 4).

Table 4. Ratio of Personnel to Characterize the Professional HDF¹⁶⁴

Officer	11-14%
NCO	33-38%
Contract soldiers	33-45%
Public servants/civil servants	11-15%

In addition to changes to active service in Hungary, the entire reserve service will also need to be revamped under the voluntary system. While a portion of reservists can be allocated from those who left the regular service, the new reserve system will also need to draw on from the untrained civilian ranks, both male and female. This will be a challenge.¹⁶⁵ For a brief time, there was a move afoot to establish a National Guard type organization to keep the idea of a conscript-style national service alive. It would have been a reserve type force able to serve both traditional military and domestic type missions. However, it appears that support for the National Guard concept has recently collapsed.¹⁶⁶

The Hungarian's realize that a professional force will drive many other changes including a change in force structure as well as the force culture.¹⁶⁷ It is projected that 3,000 to 4,500 new recruits will be required annually to fill the ranks of the new armed forces during the conversion period. A more ordinary annual flow of 1,350 to 2,250

¹⁶³ Zoltan Banary, "Hungary: An Outpost on a Troubled Periphery," 100.

¹⁶⁴ "Defense: Hungary," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessments – the Balkans*.

¹⁶⁵ "Shaping an Armed Forces for the 21st Century," Hungarian Defense Mirror, 16.

¹⁶⁶ Pál Dunay, "The Armed Forces in the Hungarian Society: Finding a Role?," 13.

¹⁶⁷ "Shaping an Armed Forces for the 21st Century," *Hungarian Defense Mirror*, 15.

recruits will be required after the conversion is complete. This will be a challenge. In order to draw enough willing applicants, higher salaries and an incentive system will be necessary. The Hungarian MoD is again developing plans to attract recruits, train professional soldiers, provide career enhancements, and develop an adequate retirement system.¹⁶⁸ The numbers of new recruits required will make the Hungarian Army the employer requiring the largest number of new hires for years to come. Unfortunately, up to this point, the attrition rate among current contract soldiers has been higher than is tolerable to meet the numbers required. Also, recruiting contract quotas have fallen far short since 1997. Only 4,000 of the authorized quota of 7,000 have been filled in recent years.¹⁶⁹ For all of the reasons described as well as quality of life issues, enough of the eligible candidates do not consider service in the Hungarian military attractive. As such, the vicious circle continues.

If not addressed aggressively, quality of life issues will continue to undermine many of Hungary's plans to improve their armed forces with a professional military. Current living conditions and salaries are substandard and not likely to be acceptable to professionals.¹⁷⁰ As with the other services, the army is working hard to improve the living conditions and salaries of professional personnel. This, along with other associated transition costs, is expected to absorb the bulk of the army's share of the defense budget over the next several years.¹⁷¹

Though improving, the issue of military pay is a serious one in the HDF and threatens to undermine many positive efforts. In real terms, compensation for military personnel is extremely low and many live below the poverty level.¹⁷² The rate of pay for an involuntary conscript soldier is only Ft7,000 (\$32) per month. The rates for other enlisted soldiers are too low as well. However, officers pay rates have improved and are considered more reasonable by civilian standard. A lieutenant earns roughly Ft28,000

¹⁶⁸ "Shaping an Armed Forces for the 21st Century," *Hungarian Defense Mirror*, 16.

¹⁶⁹ "Hungarian Defense Minister on Army Reform, Aircraft Purchase Negotiations," *Nepszava Web Site*, BBC Monitoring Europe – Political, BBC Worldwide Monitoring, September 13, 2002; Jeffrey Simon, *Hungary and NATO: Problems In Civil-Military Relations*, 99

¹⁷⁰ Zoltan Barany, "Hungary: An Outpost on the Troubled Periphery," 97.

¹⁷¹ "NATO Supreme Commander Praises Hungarian Military Reforms," *International News*, Associated Press Worldstream, July 7, 2003.

¹⁷² Zoltan Barany, "Hungary: An Outpost on the Troubled Periphery," 101.

(\$128) per month. The average monthly pay for senior officers is Ft42,000 (\$192) per month. A top officer earns up to Ft100,000 (\$457) per month. As previously mentioned, progress has been made in increasing NCO pay towards an acceptable level as well. However, military compensation remains a serious issue that has been reported on widely in Hungary, but has not yet been addressed to the extent necessary.¹⁷³

F. MODERNIZATION EFFORTS

The HDF consists of two services -- the army and the air force. The 400-strong Maritime Wing, active on the Danube, is part of the army. To integrate with NATO requirements, Hungary needs to possess both rapid reaction as well as 'main,' or territorial defense forces. Reaction forces include stand-by and rapid-reaction forces with high manning levels. Based on their organization, training, command system, modern technical equipment and logistics support, these must be able to act independently at home or, as a member of a NATO-led operation, in various operations abroad. Hungary has been slowly modernizing and downsizing its armed forces since it left the Warsaw Pact in 1990.¹⁷⁴ In line with other NATO forces, the Hungarian Army is being reorganized to meet the criteria required. In concert with the move from conscription to all-professional forces, the HDF's primary focus will be to prepare forces assigned to NATO's reaction forces and continue NATO-led peace support operations in Bosnia and Kosovo.

In recent years the army has gone to great efforts to reorganize into two divisional commands. However, Hungary has made only small efforts to modernize their military equipment to meet NATO standards. The most significant equipment acquisition for the army since joining NATO is the Mistral 2 low-level air-defense missile, ordered in 1997. The contract for the Mistral 2 is believed to be worth in the neighborhood of \$100 million (U.S.). However, further funding for equipment procurement is likely to remain limited. The T-72M1 Main Battle Tank and the BTR-80 Armored Personnel Carrier will remain the backbone of the army's armored fighting vehicle fleet for at least the next decade. Service officials are planning to improve their interoperability with NATO forces by

¹⁷³ "Army: Hungary," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – The Balkans*.

¹⁷⁴ "Background Note: Hungary," Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. State Department, July 2002, internet site <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2852.htm>, accessed September 26, 2003.

making minor modifications to their existing armored vehicles to make them more compatible with NATO's needs. More ambitious equipment plans will have to await the completion of the transformation process.¹⁷⁵

The Hungarian Air Force is in the midst of significant re-organization and re-equipment efforts of its own. In September 2001, the service came under the auspices of the newly established Air Force Command. Marking the re-organization of the country's former Air Force Staff, the measure was another in a series of steps intended to bring not only Hungary's military equipment, but also its command procedures, into line with NATO standards. As an example of the current lack of inter-operability, the air force's MiG-29s lack Identification Friend-or-Foe (IFF) units, and therefore cannot work in alliance operations. While the MiG-29 is being upgraded, several Soviet era ground attack fighters including MiG-21s have recently been retired. Developments such as the introduction of new fighters and the ability to conduct more joint training should allow for greater Hungarian participation in future collaborative operations and exercises. Hungary has also offered NATO the use of assets such as its Mi-17 transport helicopters.¹⁷⁶

To address its desire to continue to control its own airspace, Hungary has been wrestling with the issue of replacing supersonic fighters for its retired MiG21s and aging MiG-29s. Shortly after canceling the purchase of American F-16 fighters, in September of 2001, the Hungarian Ministry of Defense announced that it would lease 14 JAS-39 Gripen multi-role fighters from Sweden.¹⁷⁷ Though less expensive than the F-16, the decision set off a storm of controversy because, as configured, the Gripen fighters lack aerial refueling capability and cannot be used outside the continent. Critics within the Hungarian government have charged that acquiring a fighter that could not be deployed by NATO was done intentionally by the Orbán cabinet. Thus, the fighters could only be used for air intercept missions at home. While others in the government have denied that they intended to evade generating an asset that NATO could use, it was noted that the

¹⁷⁵ "Army: Hungary," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – The Balkans*.

¹⁷⁶ "Air Force: Hungary," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – The Balkans*.

¹⁷⁷ "Hungary will Buy F-16's from US," *Budapest Magyar Hirlap*, February 13, 2001. Internet News Group <http://newsgroup:rec.aviation.military/>, accessed October 1, 2003.

contract was written so that the Gripen's could be modified to enjoy the capability of airborne refueling at a later date in the unlikely event that it became necessary.¹⁷⁸

Once operational, the Gripen fighters will be assigned to replace the MiG-21 fighters that are being retired. Additionally, fourteen of the service's current MiG-29 fighters began an upgrade program contracted to the Russians in 2002. This step will keep them operational until around 2010. The upgrade includes equipping the aircraft with NATO-compatible systems. The MiG-29s are scheduled to be replaced by a new fighter early next decade. It is projected that around 30 additional fighters will be acquired.

G. NATO SUPPORT AND PERFORMANCE

One of Hungary's early values to the alliance has proven to be its location, due to its proximity to the nations making up the former Yugoslavia. The United States and other alliance forces have used Hungarian airspace and the airbase at Tasár to support the Bosnian peace enforcement missions since 1996. However, during the Yugoslav conflicts, the large ethnic Hungarian populations in both Serbia and Croatia, particularly in Vojvodina, were a constant concern. As a result, Hungarian involvement in peacekeeping efforts was always being questioned inside Hungary.¹⁷⁹ Nobody wanted those of Hungarian decent opposing each other if hostilities ignited. Nevertheless, in spite of a slow start, the HDF has constantly supported the efforts in Bosnia (i.e. SFOR) with an average of 200 people and it has consistently contributed an average of 325 people to Kosovo Peace efforts (KFOR). These contributions are comparable to other alliance members of like size.¹⁸⁰ Peace-support operations in Bosnia (i.e. SFOR) and Kosovo (i.e. KFOR) have provided the army with valuable experience conducting NATO operations. Unfortunately, despite NATO's invoking Article 5, Hungary's refusal to consider the deployment of soldiers to support Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and offering only medical doctors was a disappointment.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁸ "Hungary: Ex-government Allegedly chose Gripen to Avoid Overseas NATO Tasks," *Nepszabadsag*, Budapest, September 9, 2002, BBC Monitoring Europe – Political, Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 5.

¹⁷⁹ Zoltan Barany, "Hungary: An Outpost on the Troubled Periphery," 82; Jeffrey Simon, *Hungary and NATO: Problems In Civil-Military Relations*, 100.

¹⁸⁰ "Integrating New Allies into NATO," *CBO Paper*, 11.

¹⁸¹ Jeffrey Simon, *Hungary and NATO: Problems In Civil-Military Relations*, 100.

Outside of peacekeeping missions, Hungary's largest NATO commitment involves the 25th Mechanized Brigade that is dedicated to the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). The brigade is assigned to the 1st Armored Division (U.S.) headquartered in Germany. In September 2001, the brigade hosted 1st Armory Division units for a 10-day interoperability exercise at Hungary's Hajmasker training area.¹⁸²

Hungary continues to fulfill NATO's expectations by being an active participant in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. Following a trilateral agreement signed by Hungary, Italy and Slovenia in October 1999, the three nations formally activated the Multinational Land Force (MLF) during Exercise "Esperia 2001", taking place November of 2001 in Italy. The MFL is tasked with peace-support operations under the auspices of NATO as well as the EU.¹⁸³

H. CONCLUSION

In review, Hungary had some advantages when it first joined NATO. Its openness along with the existence of many private groups and private enterprises made democracy and free markets an easier transition than for other postcommunist countries. Democratic consolidation proved not to be a difficult objective compared to problems suffered by other former communist countries. Additionally, Hungary has had a long tradition of civilian control of the military. These critical factors, required for successful NATO integration, have given Hungary several advantages. However, transformation of the military almost stalled due to disinterest.

Due to abysmal defense spending, the modernization of armaments and equipment has never reached the stage where a professional military seemed necessary.¹⁸⁴ Rather than embracing the professionalization of the military from a forward-looking vantage point, politicians are being pushed into it by a public opinion that has an extreme distaste for forced conscription. There are no apparent movements afoot to embrace new

¹⁸² "Army: Hungary", *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – The Balkans*.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Pál Dunay, "Building Professional Competence in Hungary's Defense: Slow Motion," A synopsis of a presentation given at a conference organized by ESCR's "Transformation of Civil-Military Relations in Comparative Context" Research Process, July 2001, internet site <http://www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/GRC/CMR/TCMR%20Papers/TMCSR%201.12.htm>, accessed October 3, 2003.

international commitments or changes in technology. While the public expresses general support the Hungarian military and the security NATO brings them, they see no incentive to spend very much on it, because they see no territorial threats to Hungary requiring the military. And there is no sign that they have a greater allegiance to the European or transatlantic communities as a whole, other than for what it can do for them as a nation. Like in the Czech Republic, nationalism continues to the extent that Hungary insists on patrolling its own airspace – something it really cannot afford to do. However, they continue to do so, even to the point of endangering aircrews by not allowing them a sufficient number of flying hours.¹⁸⁵ Hungary continue to spend a far smaller percentage of its GDP than it should to support NATO integration due to public disinterest, but also due to compromises made to achieve other societal goals.

The military has slowly increased its prestige if not its effectiveness since the breakup of the Warsaw Pact. Reforms are happening, though painfully slowly. The HDF is putting forth a vigorous reform program but the challenge is always funding. Hungary is an extreme example of what is plaguing European states that feel safe under the NATO umbrella. The issue boils down to a vicious civil-military relations circle. In spite of what Hungarian politicians and military officials know is necessary, it is ultimately public's priorities that drive the politicians. Since the public believes that there are no current threats to Hungary as a member of NATO, the military is far down the priority list for new funding initiatives. Other priorities are of much greater concern. As such, the military remains impoverished to the point that some members are living below the poverty level with poor facilities, and little reason for any self-esteem. While the perception is accurate, one only need to look at Hungarian history and geography to see how easily it can be overrun, especially now that it only possesses one third of the territory that it once did. It has no natural borders or other intimidating landmasses to protect it, and defensively, its military is much weaker than it was in 1989.¹⁸⁶ Although it appears that many of the promises made to NATO upon accession were wishful thinking, the Hungarian defense ministry is learning from past mistakes and beginning to chart a more realistic course towards integration. As long as the military continues

¹⁸⁵ Jeffrey Simon, *Hungary and NATO: Problems In Civil-Military Relations*, 57.

¹⁸⁶ Zoltan Barany, "Hungary: An Outpost on the Troubled Periphery," 75.

without a relevant role in postcommunist Hungary, it is likely to remain a secondary priority for some time to come.

The case of Hungary provides evidence that, during the first round of NATO expansion, decisions regarding choosing new members were political more than substantive from a capabilities point of view. Under the best scenario it will be many more years before the HDF will provide much in the way of operational military worth. So far the Hungarians have not lived up to either NATO's expectations or their own promises, leading to allegations that they are the alliance "easyriders." However, as we have seen, public opinion inside Hungary makes it difficult to expect improvements in the near future. There does not appear to be any solution to the problems, short of the possible emergence of inspired and resourceful leadership coupled with sustained economic growth to break the negative civil-military cycle.

IV. INTEGRATION OF POLAND INTO NATO

...Poland has been recognized as a success story in terms of its transition towards a consolidated democracy. This is not to say that the country's political life and institutions are a paragon of democratic virtue, but in comparative terms, it has defied critics by its ability to stay the course in the turbulent waters of transition.¹⁸⁷

As a medium size power sandwiched between two larger powers, its geography has punished Poland. Nevertheless, Polish society has long held their armed force in high prestige as the defender of the nation-state. Interestingly, the unprecedented brutality of the Nazi and Soviet regimes forged strong bonds between Polish society and its soldiers. This bond was in spite of the inability of the Polish military to repel the invaders, particularly in 1939.

After the Second World War, the communist led Polish Peoples Army (Ludowe Wojsko Polskiego, LWP) never really gained legitimacy in Polish society, remaining subservient to the Soviet Union. Its officer corps was made up of a high percentage of non-Polish Soviet officers.¹⁸⁸ As part of the Warsaw Pact, the LWP played an active role in the Soviet led crushing of the rebellion in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Throughout its half century of existence, the LWP never truly achieved the status of a sovereign military. It never really owed its primary allegiance to the Polish Government.¹⁸⁹

A. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Since the end of the communist era, the Polish military has fully regained its status in society. In contrast to the Czech Republic and Hungary, the historical positive image of the armed forces has reemerged and has given significant support to Polish

¹⁸⁷ Paul Latawski, "Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in Postcommunist Poland: the Interplay of History, Political Society and Institutional Reform," *Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe*, Edited by Andrew Cotter, Timothy Edwards, and Anthony Forster, New York: Palgrave Publishers Ltd., 2002, 21.

¹⁸⁸ Paul Latawski, "The Polish Armed Forces and Society," Chapter 5 of *Transforming Postcommunist Militaries: Professionalization of the Armed Forces in Central and Eastern Europe*, University of Bristol, 2001, 1-4. Internet site <http://www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/GRC/CMR/TCMR%20Papers/Poland.pdf>, accessed October 10, 2003.

¹⁸⁹ Latawski, "Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in Postcommunist Poland: the Interplay of History, Political Society and Institutional Reform," 4.

efforts to integrate into NATO. In a Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) opinion poll conducted in 1998 regarding the most popular institutions in society, the armed forces came in third place. Only Polish radio and television were more popular.¹⁹⁰ Other polling evidence conducted over a significant period of time seems to reinforce these results. In February of 1998 and April of 2002, the armed forces occupied first place among institutions by 71-percent and 79-percent of respondents.¹⁹¹ The prestige of the military officer corps is also very high. Opinion poll evidence in Poland shows that in a hierarchy of prestige among professions, being an army officer stands in fifth position, behind doctors, managing directors of major firms, university professors and diplomats. Since 1988, it appears that the prestige of the officer corps in society has increased.¹⁹²

Traditionalism in Polish society, highlighted by the strength of the Roman Catholic church, continues to be a catalyst of support for the military. That being said, there is little evidence that many of the social questions that are high on the agenda of other long-standing NATO member states have emerged in the Polish civil-military relationship. The Polish military is not in sync with the more liberal “postmodern” military agenda. For example, while there has been a growth in opportunities for women in business and the professions in Poland, this has not carried over to the military.¹⁹³ Women have now been introduced to the armed forces beginning in the medical field and other designated specialist areas, but their role is a modest one. Extreme resistance to their entry remains. While the number of women has been rising, in 2001 the number of women in the armed forces comprised only 288 with another 240 or so in training. This means that women comprised only 0.1 percent of the forces, compared to 3.7-percent in the Czech Republic, 9.6-percent in Hungary, and 14-percent in the United States during the same time frame. There are no designated programs designed to recruit a greater

¹⁹⁰ Opinion poll by CBOS, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, March 10, 1998, as reported in Latawski, “Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in Postcommunist Poland: the Interplay of History, Political Society and Institutional Reform,” 15.

¹⁹¹ Opinion Polls by OBOP, in: Polish News Agency PAP, February 16, 1998 and ‘Polacy ufają mundurowi,’ *Polska Zbrojna*, April 28, 2002, as reported in Latawski, “Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in Postcommunist Poland: the Interplay of History, Political Society and Institutional Reform,” 16.

¹⁹² S. Jarmoszko, “Oficerowie Wojsko Polskiego przelomu wieków: Zarys socjologii empirycznej zawodu oficera,” Warsaw: Adam Marszałek, 2002), 86., as found in Paul Latawski, “Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in Postcommunist Poland: the Interplay of History, Political Society and Institutional Reform,” 14.

¹⁹³ Latawski, “The Polish Armed Forces and Society,” 10.

portion of women in the armed forces.¹⁹⁴ The recent high unemployment rate and the reduced size of the Polish military have not made that necessary.

As another example of traditionalism in the military, and in striking exception to the communist period, “field ordinariates” for the Roman Catholic Church are active in the armed forces. While this has provoked some criticism by those who feel that the uniformed priest has replaced the “political officer” of the Soviet era, because the church is so strong in Polish society, its influence has helped build bonds between the military to the mainstream of Polish society.¹⁹⁵

In spite of the overwhelmingly positive attitude towards the military by the public, there are some warning signs likely to work against maintaining as high a level of support for the military in the future. First, as mentioned, the processes of major economic and social change from the outside may be pushing the Polish attitude towards traditional military values in a different direction. Despite the importance Poland attaches to NATO membership and co-operative security, few officials in Poland fear direct threat to Polish territory in the near future. Instead, Warsaw identifies economic crisis, criminal organizations, and international terrorism as prime areas of concern.¹⁹⁶ If Polish society starts to echo the concerns of their elites, the importance of the military may begin to depreciate.

Second, for eighty years, conscription has traditionally played a role in attaching the Polish military to society in a positive way. However, conscription has been greatly reduced in terms of the numbers required and the length of service. In 1997, around 40-percent of the pool of young men who became eligible were conscripted. By 2001, the percentage had dropped to only 22-percent. Current trends suggest that Poles may soon become willing to drop conscription all together, thus removing a critical link between society and the armed forces.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., 11.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., 6.

¹⁹⁶ “Defense Spending – Poland,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - Central Europe And The Baltic States, Jane’s, September 29, 2003. Internet Site http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/ceursu/polas010.htm@current&QueryText=null&Prod_Name=CEURSU&image=browse&#section3, accessed October 21, 2003.

¹⁹⁷ Latawski, “The Polish Armed Forces and Society,” 16.

Third, much of the public support for the armed forces appears to be built on traditional homeland and territorial defense missions. However, the type of roles that NATO is likely to perform may require regular deployments for peacekeeping and Article 4 type power projection missions. Opinion polls show that members of the Polish armed forces are willing to serve aboard.¹⁹⁸ However, polling also suggests that 65-percent of the public initially were opposed to sending troops to support the coalition operations in Afghanistan. While subsequent polling in January of 2002 rebounded to suggest that opinion was evenly split, concerns regarding such missions persist.¹⁹⁹ A more recent poll in July 2003 (CBOS) shows that around 55-percent of those polled were against Polish troop participation in the American lead Iraqi Freedom mission and only 36-percent were supportive of it.²⁰⁰ While this mission was controversial across Europe, it still illustrates that, like other Europeans have demonstrated, the Poles are not afraid to oppose Western generated missions that do not fit into their security paradigm.

Fourth, another conflict that is starting to face Poland as well as other former Warsaw Pact states is the apparent conflict between NATO and the EU's European Security and Defense Policy. Poland has consistently stated that it "...refuses to make a choice..." between NATO and its EU ambitions.²⁰¹ While Poles were initially hesitant about the EU's ambition to set up a European security structure, the September 11th attacks on the United States in 2001 and the ensuing American tendency towards unilateralism may have weakened the role of NATO in the eyes of some. In addition, the growing co-operation between the U.S. and Russia raises concerns in Warsaw about U.S. support for a strong and independent Ukraine. Both trends are perceived by some as contradictory to the Polish security strategy that generally favors a strong U.S. presence

¹⁹⁸ A series of opinion polls by the Military Sociology Research Organization indicated that 80-percent of the professional soldiers supported deployment outside Poland, as reported from Polska Zbrojna, August 26, 2001, cited in Latawski, "The Polish Armed Forces and Society," 15.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, 15.

²⁰⁰ "Defense, Executive Summary - Poland," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Central Europe And The Baltic States*, Jane's, September 29, 2003. Internet Site http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/ceursu/polas010.htm@current&QueryText=null&Prod_Name=CEURSU&image=browse&#section3, accessed October 21, 2003.

²⁰¹ Przemyslaw Grudzinski, "Case study: Results of First Round of Expansion – Poland's Experience," *NATO in the 21st Century – The Road Ahead*, U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State, Vol. 7, No. 1, March 2002, 37. Internet site <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0302/ijpe/toc.htm>, accessed October 20, 2003.

in Europe, a strong NATO, and a strong and independent Ukraine and Belarus to act as a buffer against future Soviet ambitions. While formally, Poland remains committed to American involvement in the EU as well as NATO, America's apparent subordination of NATO to other interests has raised concerns in Warsaw. Should such trends towards American unilateralism continue, Poland might increasingly begin to embrace EU aspirations to set up a defense and security policy.²⁰² As such, the EU could become a greater issue if European security architecture continues to evolve.²⁰³

Finally, economic slowdowns are likely to force a reprioritization of support away from the military. In the earlier years of market reform, Poland was seen as a miracle of market economic transformation. The Poles maintained a phenomenal growth rate through the year 2000. However, Poland has suffered a severe economic slowdown since. After a 4.0-percent GDP growth in 2000, GDP grew only 1.1-percent in 2001, and is projected at only 1.3-percent for 2002. The good news is that inflation fell from 10.1-percent in 2000 to less than 4-percent in 2001, and declined even further, to 1.7-percent in 2002. However, real interest rates of 8 to 9 percent remain high by international standards and have resulted in a slowdown of investment activity. The outlook for 2003 remains moderately optimistic with GDP growth expected to pick up while keeping inflation low. GDP is forecast to grow by 2.4-percent through 2003, a level slightly weaker than the Czech Republic or Hungary. GDP is then projected to rise to around 3.6-percent through 2004. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is projected to increase a modest 1.2-percent in 2003 and 1.3-percent in 2004. However, unemployment has been running at an untenable level of 17.0-percent, which is well above that of the average Central European state.²⁰⁴ From the vantage point of the Defense Ministry, unemployment is not an entirely negative event because it should continue to support recruitment for the armed forces.

²⁰² "Defense, Executive Summary - Poland," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Central Europe And The Baltic States*.

²⁰³ For one explanation regarding how this process could evolve in the not so distant future, see Charles Kupchan, *The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century*, (New York: Random House, Inc., 2002), 119-159.

²⁰⁴ "Davidson Institute Emerging Markets Forecasts (DIEMF): Quarterly Economic Forecasts for Central and Eastern Europe," William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan, July 15, 2003.

In general, the economic picture described makes it difficult to fund the military. Poland's desire to integrate into the European Union (EU) also limits funding for the military because the projected deficit for 2003 stands at around 4.8-percent of GDP.²⁰⁵ This is above the 3.0-percent maximum deficit figure allowed for those states wishing to merge into the European Monetary Union (EMU) currency markets. Just as in the Czech Republic and Hungary, the Polish Military continues to get squeezed by the competing goal of EU currency integration.

In spite of its severe economic dip, Poland is showing itself to be fairly resilient, both economically as well as politically. After the famous *Solidarity* movements led by Lech Walesa in the 1980's as well as the strength of the Roman Catholic Church in communist times, Poles proved to be better prepared than most for democracy and a market economy.²⁰⁶ Considering the tremendous institutional shift that was required after the fall of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, Poland has had only a few bumps in developing what appears to be a stable democracy and a working market economy in less than a decade. Poland's "Freedom House" scores are both excellent, listed as a "1" on the Human Rights scale and a "2" on the Civil Liberties scale consistently from 1993 through 2000.²⁰⁷ Poland is judged to have only a moderate amount of corruption compared to other former Warsaw Pact countries with a rating of 4.0 on the corruption perception index in 2002, based on surveys conducted by Transparency International.²⁰⁸ All of these achievements bode well for meeting NATO's standards.

Like many of the Warsaw Pact nations, Poland began its development of democracy in approximately 1989 with severe civil-military authority concerns. This is partly because the Polish military has a long history of involvement in domestic

²⁰⁵"Defense, Executive Summary - Poland," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Central Europe And The Baltic States*.

²⁰⁶ Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stephan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, 264-265, 453.

²⁰⁷ Freedom House Country Ratings, internet site is <http://www.freedomhouse.org/>, accessed September 18, 2003.

²⁰⁸ Barney, *The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies*, 223. As is reported from *Transparency International*, an organization that compares the perception of corruption in nations around the world. The scale is 10 being the least corrupt and 0 being the most corrupt. The internet site is <http://www.gwdg.de/~uwwv/2002Data.html>, accessed September 18, 2003.

politics.²⁰⁹ Interestingly, it was the military's involvement in politics that is recognized by many as what peacefully delivered Poland from under the dominance of Soviet communism to democracy. Starting in the late 1970s, the legendary General Wojciech Jaruzelski became the defining figure in the Polish armed forces and, through the 1980s, the defining figure of all the autonomy that Poland maintained from the Soviet Union. When the *Solidarity* movement became a threat to the current communist state of affairs, it was "...Jaruzelski and his associates who replaced the party aparatchicks as the country's leadership and offered the Soviets the Polish martial law solution as an alternative to an all-out invasion by the Warsaw Pact."²¹⁰ Serving as both the First Secretary of the Communist Party as well as the Prime Minister, Jaruzelski imposed Martial Law on December 13, 1981. Later, as communist control weakened in the late 1980s, it was Jaruzelski, while holding almost dictatorial control over nearly every institution of military and civilian power in Poland, who peacefully transferred power to members of the former *Solidarity* movement. These were the same opposition members who had the stated goals of ending communism as well as punishing Jaruzelski and his associates. Although a controversial figure in Poland, in the view of many, Jaruzelski protected the country from invasion and potential ruin until Soviet dominance had lifted.²¹¹

The trend of politicization of the military continued into the 1990s, primarily due to inherent problems of the transition to an open society and the legacy of the past. Examples of allegations include the 1992 "Parys affair" and the 1994 "lunch at Drawsko affair."²¹² By 1995, bitter infighting between the parliament and the president threatened a constitutional crisis over the issue of civilian control of the military.²¹³ Structural irregularities made it difficult to define what powers controlled the Army, and to distinguish between the powers of the Defense Ministry and the Chief of the General

²⁰⁹ Paul Latawski, "Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in Postcommunist Poland: the Interplay of History, Political Society and Institutional Reform," 24.

²¹⁰ Andrew Michta, *The Soldier-Citizen: The Politics of the Polish Army after Communism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 41.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, 42.

²¹² Details about the allegations of these affairs can be found in Paul Latawski's "Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in Postcommunist Poland: the Interplay of History, Political Society and Institutional Reform," 30-32.

²¹³ Andrew Michta, *America's new Allies: Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in NATO*, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999), 50.

Staff. Also typical for the former communist transition states of Europe, there were not clear lines of demarcation between the powers of the Chief of the General Staff and civilian components. Another civil-military problem during the 1990s was that Poland lacked civilian expertise in military affairs. As a result, most of the Defense Ministry was made up of military personnel. This problem is recently resolving itself as successive Defense Ministers have slowly civilianized the MOD.²¹⁴

To address these issues, a series of reforms and, in particular, the *Law of the Office of the Defense Minister* as well as the new Polish constitution of 1997 did much to clarify the roles of the different political institutions charged with democratic oversight of the armed forces. In particular, these documents placed the Chief of the General Staff underneath the Defense Ministry. A civilian Defense Minister was created. The President was clarified to be the Commander in Chief. Traditional oversight duties were clarified to belong to the *Sejm* (i.e. Parliament). In July of 1999, the Polish government approved a set of regulations that will reorganize its top military leadership along the lines of the U.S. Joint Staff. Term limits for these high command positions were introduced and Parliament gained control over the defense budget.²¹⁵ In 2000, the General Staff of the Armed Forces was reshaped into a more coherent planning organization, aiming to strengthen civilian control of the Army.²¹⁶ All of these changes were encouraged by Poland's desire to create an apolitical defense ministry and meet the standards required for NATO membership.²¹⁷ The continued influence of NATO encourages the need for the military to remain subordinate to civilian authority. As such, there is little sign that Poland's past legacy of a politicized military is likely to affect its future.²¹⁸

²¹⁴ Jeffrey Simon, *NATO Enlargement and Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations*, 67-70.

²¹⁵ "Integrating New allies into NATO," *CBO Paper*, x.

²¹⁶ Paul Latawski, "Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in Postcommunist Poland: the Interplay of History, Political Society and Institutional Reform," 32-36.

²¹⁷ Przemyslaw Grudzinski, "Case Study: Results of First Round Expansion – Poland's Experience," *NATO in The 21st Century*, U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State, Vol. 7, No. 1, March 2002, 36. Internet Site http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/fpa/fpa_mar02.pdf, accessed October 21, 2003.

²¹⁸ Paul Latawski, "Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in Postcommunist Poland: the Interplay of History, Political Society and Institutional Reform," 39.

B. DEFENSE BUDGETS

Like most NATO members, Poland has reduced its spending as a percentage of GDP from 2.5-percent in 1988 to 2.3-percent in 1998. In comparative terms, Poland's spending has been somewhat higher than the spending of its former Warsaw Pact neighbors. Poland spent \$3.2-billion in 1996, \$3.5-billion in 1997, and almost \$3.6-billion in 1998.²¹⁹ However, between 1997 and 2001, Polish defense spending was slowly reduced from 2.2-percent to 1.89-percent. This is in spite of the fact that when Poland first joined NATO in 1999, it pledged to increase defense spending to 3.0-percent of GNP. While its initial pledge was probably made with the most enthusiastic of intentions, the promise proved not to be realistic. Polish officials now say that the 3.0-percent of GDP figure is a long-term goal to be achieved over the next 15 years.²²⁰ In fact, through 2006, while there are indications that the Poles are actually spending more than promised, Poland is now only guaranteeing spending of 1.95-percent of its GDP on defense from 2001 through 2006.²²¹ Like in the Czech Republic and Hungary, the desire to join the EU currency markets and economic slowdown has constrained Poland's military appropriation. That being said, as of 2001, Poland ranked eighth in relationship to the other NATO members in terms of defense spending as a percentage of GDP according to the Secretary of Defense's 2001 report on allied burden sharing.²²²

While the percentage of GDP is a significant indicator of commitment, it indicates very little about a state's immediate ability to contribute to the alliance. For example, while Poland has approximately the same population as Spain with roughly 39 million people, the Polish GDP is much smaller. Spain has a GDP of \$568 billion. While devoting only 1.27-percent of its 2003 GDP to support the troop strength of 143,500, Spain is able to generate a defense budget of \$7.2 billion. Poland, on the other hand, will most likely devote close to 2.0-percent of its GDP to defense. However, with a GDP of only \$160 billion, its defense budget is less than half -- \$3.3 billion -- that of Spain, and yet it continues to support a larger number of troops. This comparison is quite telling of

²¹⁹ "Integrating New allies into NATO," CBO Paper, 6.

²²⁰ Ibid., 5.

²²¹ Joseph Ralston in, "Successfully Managing NATO Enlargement," *NATO in the 21st Century – The Road Ahead*, U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State, Vol. 7, No. 1, March 2002, 18. Internet site <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0302/ijpe/toc.htm>, accessed October 20, 2003.

²²² Ibid.

the problems encountered by most of the new emerging democracies of Central Europe. Obviously, the same capacity to modernize is not going to be present in Poland compared to Spain, in spite of a supportive society.²²³

C. RESTRUCTURING AND MODERNIZATION

As in all of the former Warsaw Pact militaries as well as most western militaries, restructuring and modernization has been extensive and is ongoing in spite of funding challenges.²²⁴ When one considers the size of the force being transformed, the Polish armed forces have survived with prestige and high morale intact. In addition to weathering continuous political change, in 1988, the Polish armed forces numbered more than 400,000. By 1995, force strength was cut by 40-percent. At the end of 2003, active force levels should drop to 165,000 with around 59-percent of them being conscripts. Poland also maintains a separate reserve totaling another 400,000.²²⁵ Further reductions are planned. It appears that active force levels are slated to be dropped to as low as 150,000 by the end of 2006.²²⁶ Unfortunately, the rapid downsizing of the army, which dropped by 42,000 troops in 2001, spells increased unemployment in many regions in Poland, where the military is the only employer in the vicinity.²²⁷ However, reducing the force levels has to be done for further modernization to take place. In contrast to Hungary, there is no sign that demographics and low military pay in Poland will preclude its ability to support its force structure any time soon.²²⁸

²²³ Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edwards, and Anthony Forster, "Military Matters: Beyond Prague," *NATO Review*, Autumn 2002. Internet site <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue3/english/military.html>, accessed September 25, 2003.

²²⁴ Paul Latawski, "Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in Postcommunist Poland: the Interplay of History, Political Society and Institutional Reform," 23.

²²⁵ "Armed Forces - Poland," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Central Europe And The Baltic States*, Jane's, September 29, 2003. Internet Site http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp?K2DocKey=%2Fcontent1%2Fjanesdata%2Fsent%2Fceursu%2Fpolas100.htm@current&Prod_Name=CEURSU&, accessed February 25, 2003.

²²⁶ Paul Latawski, "Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in Postcommunist Poland: the Interplay of History, Political Society and Institutional Reform," 23.

²²⁷ "Prime Minister Leszek Miller meets Gen. Joseph Ralston, Supreme Commander," Events, The Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Republic of Poland, July 2, 2002, internet site http://www.kprm.gov.pl/english/2130_5144.htm, accessed, October 22, 2003.

²²⁸ Jeffrey Simon, "New NATO Members: Will They Contribute," *Strategic Forum*, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Number 160, April 1999.

Poland has been working hard to change its Warsaw Pact style “reverse pyramid” command structure. In spite of severe cuts during the early 1990s, by 1998, the Polish military still maintained 3,500 Colonels and 120 Generals. Cuts in officer ranks are continuing at a pace that is deemed palatable. While continuing to retire many high-ranking officers, professional Senior NCOs continue to be developed to replace many of these officers and assume a more Western style military. Recognizing the need to build a corps of professional non-commissioned officers (NCO), plans call to increase their numbers from 28-percent of the professional force in 2001 to 67-percent in 2006. The rank of warrant officer is being eliminated, and the number of officers will be cut from 42-percent of the present career force to 33-percent by 2006, most of the cuts coming from the senior ranks.²²⁹

Poland continues to drastically cut the number of conscripts, recently cutting the term of conscription from 24 months to 12 months. With the greatly reduced number of conscripts, the remaining conscript force can now be concentrated on territorial defense, allowing the professional military to handle technical missions.²³⁰ The idea of moving completely to an all-volunteer professional armed forces is not yet resolved in Poland and continues to be debated at a high level. Some officials expect that an all-volunteer service can be realized by the end of the decade. In the short run, economic and political considerations are the limiting factor. However, in the long run, an all-volunteer force is projected by many to be more cost effective and will be better able to meet future requirements. While trends in Poland seem to be leading it towards an all-volunteer professional force, a decision in this direction has not yet been made.²³¹

The impact of the large-scale manpower reductions on civil-military relations, particularly among the professional (i.e. volunteer, non-conscript) element has not been well studied in Poland. However, the turbulence does not appear to have affected the prestige of the Polish military to the same degree as it has in the Czech Republic or

²²⁹ “Secretariat Report,” Annual Tour, Poland: July 29 - August 5, 2001, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, August 31, 2001, 2. Internet Site <http://www.nato-pa.int/archivedpub/trip/01annualtour.asp>, accessed July 23, 2003.

²³⁰ Andrew Michta, *America’s new Allies: Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in NATO*, 52.

²³¹ Paul Latawski, “Professionalization of the Polish Armed Forces,” found as a synopsis of a seminar held July 2001 entitled *Transforming Postcommunist Militaries: Professionalization of Armed Forces in Central and Eastern Europe*, University of Bristol, 2001, internet site <http://www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/GRC/CMR/TCMR%20Papers/TCMR%201.12.htm>, accessed October 3, 2003, 1.

Hungary. The prestige of the officer corps generally remains quite high. Opinion poll evidence in Poland shows that in a hierarchy of prestige among professions, being an army officer stands in fifth position behind doctors, managing directors of major firms, university professors and diplomats. Since 1988, it appears that the prestige of the officer corps in society has increased.²³²

The downsizing of forces has left its negative marks on the officer corps. While 85-percent of the downsizing has been completed by encouraging resignations, it has been suggested by some that the wrong people have been leaving. While overall force goals have still been met, retaining officers with critical skills has been an issue.²³³ Pay and training issues among the officer corps may be partially to blame.²³⁴ Nevertheless, it does appear that Poland has been weathering force reductions better than could have been expected.

D. PLANS FOR REFORM

Poland has made steady progress towards reorganizing its military in a way that integrates well with NATO. The process has been unsettling for the officers in charge because the military is trying to work at changing everything at once, including force structure, staff organizations, training programs, doctrine, security procedures and so on.²³⁵ In addition to a reasonable level of defense spending, another reason for the good progress in making defense reforms is because of good continuity in the Polish planning process. The Defense Ministry has been able to stay on task. The Polish have published two editions of *The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland* – one in 1992 and another in 2000.²³⁶ These documents are quite general in nature. To apply the

²³² S. Jarmoszko, "Oficerowie Wojsko Polskiego przelomu wieków: Zarys socjologii empirycznej zawodu oficera," (Warsaw: Adam Marszałek, 2002), 86., as found in Latawski, "Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in Postcommunist Poland: the Interplay of History, Political Society and Institutional Reform," 14.

²³³ Jeffrey Simon, "Transforming the Armed Forces of Central and Eastern Europe." *Strategic Forum*, No. 172, June 2000, 2.

²³⁴ Michta, *America's New Allies: Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in NATO*, 50.

²³⁵ Zofia Sobiepanel, Industry Sector Analysis (ISA); Europe; Poland, Defense Market, ID: 109811, May 5, 2003, 4.

²³⁶ "The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland" can be found on the Polish Embassy Internet site at <http://www.polishembassy.ca/files/THE%20NATIONAL%20SECURITY%20STRATEGY%20OF%20THE%20REPUBLIC%20OF%20POLAND.pdf>, accessed September 20, 2003.

National Security Strategy, as well as to apply *The NATO Strategic Concept*, the Ministry of Defense publishes *The National Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland*.²³⁷ This document was last published in 2000. With its new roles in NATO in mind, in 2001, the Polish Defense Ministry published *The Program of Restructuring and Technical Modernization of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland* to develop plans to prioritize the modernization the armed forces.²³⁸ Based on results, theses planning documents seem to have led to a very systematic approach to implementing a detailed modernization plan.

To systematize the more general planning documents, significant detailed reform towards integration into the NATO alliance began on September 9, 1997 with the fifteen year program. The program is outlined in a strategic plan entitled *Army 2012: the Foundation of the Modernization Program for the Armed Forces 1998-2012*.²³⁹ This plan set a road map for integration into NATO with the assumption that nothing would disturb the peace for the following thirteen years. Then, in December 1999, then Defense Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz defined the role of the armed forces as the protection of independence and the democratic system. He listed three specific threats: types of operations involving special forces; troop concentrations on the Polish border; and counter-terrorism. Onyszkiewicz states that military doctrine has to be developed based on the notion that military capabilities should suffice to defend the national territory, but they should not be so great as to threaten the security of neighboring states. Additionally, the defensive character of the Polish armed forces should be obvious from their size, structure and deployment. The current defense strategy does not assume the existence of a specific enemy who is prepared to carry out acts of aggression. It assumes, however, the existence of potential threats and it aims to control and solve crisis situations of a military nature.²⁴⁰

²³⁷ "The National Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland," The Ministry of National Defense, Warsaw, 2000, 3.

²³⁸ Bronislaw Komorowski, "Reforming Poland's Military," *NATO Review: Web Edition*, Vol. 49 – No. 2, Summer 2001, 26-27, Internet site <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2001/0102-08.htm>, accessed October 22, 2003.

²³⁹ Michta, *America's new Allies: Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in NATO*, 51.

²⁴⁰ "Armed Forces - Poland," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Central Europe And The Baltic States*.

E. PROGRESS OF REFORMS

In spite of the budget constraints, NATO officials including Gen. Joseph Ralston, Supreme Allied Commander of European Command (EUCOM), have noted positive results towards the modernization of Poland's military.²⁴¹ Like all the former Warsaw Pact states, the need for restructuring is resulting from the change in military doctrine requiring both an offensive and a defensive strategy instead of a purely defensive one. This entails a replacement of territorial defensive forces from facing to the West to being able to act defensively on all bearings as well as to be better prepared to deploy. However, the bigger task is achieving compatibility with NATO and adoption of NATO standards, such as the creation of a Logistics Branch. In general, this means switching the emphasis from heavy armor to lighter, more mobile forces. The force structure based on heavy armor divisions destined for offensive operations is being replaced with a more flexible mix of light, rapid reaction forces and more maneuverable brigade-size armored units, which are better suited for defense. Again, like all of the former Warsaw Pact states, this means replacing a significant amount of equipment that is now obsolete.²⁴²

With over 165,000 personnel, nearly 300 combat aircraft and 14 major naval vessels, Poland clearly has the largest Army, Air Force, and Navy in Central Europe. Budget constraints are currently slowing modernization and retraining of the armed forces as has been mentioned. After achieving NATO membership at the 1999 Madrid conference, Poland now realizes that it no longer needs to achieve an "all around" defense, but can instead concentrate on being a good niche player within the broader NATO umbrella.

So far, Poland has made the greatest progress of the three recent members towards integrating its military into NATO. Its larger defense budgets, sustained progress in accomplishing their detailed modernization plan, and strong political support of the alliance have been key. However, the financial problems facing the Polish armed forces are of potential long-term concern, particularly if Poland is expected to pull its weight in the future as a NATO member. To help finance further reform, the modernization plans

²⁴¹ "Prime Minister Leszek Miller meets Gen. Joseph Ralston, Supreme Commander," Events, The Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Republic of Poland, July 2, 2002.

²⁴² "Armed Forces - Poland," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Central Europe And The Baltic States*.

call for a continuing reduction of obsolete equipment, the closure of facilities, the reduction of manpower as well as the restructuring of forces.

Current plans to reduce and restructure the force have already been discussed. The withdrawal of obsolete equipment and closure of facilities includes plans to take out of service hundreds of T-55 tanks and shells, 100 combat aircraft and eight combat ships as well as to close barracks, bases, and training grounds. Further reductions should come from changing procurement procedures and contracting out services to the private sector. These cost cutting measures should allow the defense ministry to increase the proportion of its budget allocated to capital expenditure from the level of 12-percent to 23-percent by 2006. By that time, one third of the military – rapid reaction and strategic covering forces – should be interoperable with other NATO militaries, adapted to NATO standards regarding armaments, equipment, mobility, and the ability to operate in complex missions beyond Polish territory.²⁴³

To review further detailed steps being taken and their status to date, a review of each service -- the Land Forces, Air and Air Defense Forces, and Navy -- is required.

1. Land Forces

In spite of severe budget constraints, Poland has taken many positive steps to modernize and restructure their Land Forces (Wojska Ladowe; WL). 72-percent of the current 110,000 soldiers who make up the Land Forces are conscripts. Current plans are to reduce these forces to 89,045 soldiers. 45-percent of this complement will be professional soldiers and the remaining 55-percent will be conscripts.²⁴⁴

Traditionally organized in four districts, the Land Forces are currently being reduced to two districts - a Northern Military District and a Southern Military District. A number of battalions are to be disbanded and others transferred to new garrisons that are closer to operational areas and firing ranges to reduce training costs. A separate Airborne Mechanized Corps Headquarters in Krakow will control the still incomplete airmobile 25th Air Cavalry Division (ACD), the showpiece of the Polish armed forces, as well as

²⁴³ Ibid., 26-27.

²⁴⁴ Defense, Executive Summary - Poland," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Central Europe And The Baltic States*.

four further brigades: armored, mechanized, air assault, mountain and territorial defense. These changes are increasingly preparing the Land Forces to participate in multinational efforts.²⁴⁵

Like most Western armies, the Poles are starting to manage downsizing requirements by outsourcing requirements to private ventures. For instance, in 2001, the logistics branch began outsourcing messing requirements to civilian catering companies that are to provide full service for local units. This is but one example of relaxation in the traditional Land Force mindset that has, at times, resisted change.²⁴⁶

Equipment modernization is taking place slowly. The Polish Land Forces are planning to deploy a new tactical-level unmanned air vehicle system, which can be developed by the Polish domestic aerospace industry with limited input from a foreign partner. The Land Forces are also strengthening their armored forces and increasing the number of vehicles per battalion. Extensive upgrades are planned for the 400 existing T-72M Main Battle Tanks. Also planned is the procurement of 128 Leopard 2A4 Main Battle Tanks from Germany to increase interoperability with other NATO systems, particularly the German forces. The Land Forces are developing a completely new national Command, Control and Communications (C3) system in line with NATO standards. Numerous other purchases are also being made including Multiple-Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) and second hand light attack helicopters. The Land Forces are slated to put increasing emphasis on army aviation starting in 2006.²⁴⁷

2. Air and Air Defense Forces (A&ADF)

The Polish Air and Air Defense Forces (A&ADF) have long been neglected and are heavily constrained by cash shortages causing numerous problems. Flying hours have dropped as low as 60 flying hours per year. For comparison purposes, 100 hours per year is generally considered to be a safe minimum, and pilots in the UK and

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Army - Poland," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Central Europe And The Baltic States*, Jane's, February 23, 2003. Internet Site http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp?K2DocKey=%2Fcontent1%2Fjanesdata%2Fsent%2Fceursu%2Fpolas110.htm@current&Prod_Name=CEURSU&, accessed October 15, 2003.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

elsewhere fly approximately 200 hours per year. As a result, accidents have increased, both from inadequate pilot training and from poor maintenance.²⁴⁸

In addition to the need for flying hours, Poland's aging Soviet-designed aircraft are increasingly expensive to maintain, and not interoperable with NATO systems. Currently, the Poles own approximately 250 operational fighters, some of them in storage. As procurement and doctrine decisions take place, it is obvious that a real effort is being made to achieve compatibility with western practices.²⁴⁹ As a first step to remedy the problem of aging and incompatible aircraft, the government announced the agreement to purchase 48 F-16 Fighting Falcon's with Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company on December 27, 2002. The purchase was expensive for Poland, costing an estimated \$3.8 billion (U.S.) that will be financed by the U.S. through a low interest loan. However, the F-16s makes a significant contribution to the upgrade of the Polish Air Force to NATO standards. They will be delivered between 2006 and 2008.²⁵⁰ Also, in January 2002, Germany offered Poland twenty-two MiG-29 fighters inherited from East Germany after German unification.²⁵¹

Senior officers foresee a smaller fleet of around 100 modern combat aircraft after 2012. The current fighter procurement was postured in such a way as to establish generational compatibility with follow-on procurement, which many believe should be the new U.S. F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), a multi-contractor project directed by Lockheed. These aircraft should be available to Poland in 2014 at the latest. However, there are other aircraft being considered at for future procurement including the Eurofighter Typhoon. Many of the MiG-29 air-defense fighters mentioned earlier are currently being upgraded with new communication and navigational aids so they are NATO compatible. The primary Polish attack aircraft -- the SU-22M4 -- should stay in service until 2012. It will only be upgraded if other fighter procurement talks collapse. However, a program is under way to install modern, secure communications equipment

²⁴⁸ "Air Force - Poland," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Central Europe And The Baltic States*, Jane's, February 23, 2003. Internet Site http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp?K2DocKey=%2Fcontent%2Fjanesdata%2Fsent%2Fceursu%2Fpolas110.htm@current&Prod_Name=CEURSU&, accessed October 15, 2003.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ "Poland to Buy Fighter Jets from U.S.," *International Business: New York Times*, December 27, 2002.

²⁵¹ "Armed Forces - Poland," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Central Europe And The Baltic States*.

and navigational aids on at least forty SU-22 aircraft assigned to rapid-reaction force squadrons. In order to achieve cost savings needed to procure new aircraft, the Poles are closing most of their current air bases, leaving fourteen of them operational and concentrating on improving the capabilities of seven primary airbases.²⁵²

Along with the aircraft, the Polish, Air Defense (AD) facilities fall under the A&ADF as well. Manning the A&ADF are AD personnel who man the high-level SAM batteries and the early warning radars. Many of the A&ADF facilities are in poor condition. Also, 55-percent of troops serving in the A&ADF forces are conscripts. Another concern for NATO is that Polish radar coverage looks mostly westward from fixed sites. Radar coverage for airspace to the east remains patchy. The facilities are made up of mostly Warsaw Pact era equipment that is nearing the end of its useful service life. Troop morale in these services has been shaken by the frequent reorganizations, poor pay, poor conditions, and the precarious state of the equipment. There are plans under way to develop and modernize the ground-based air defenses and preliminary discussions have been launched on a possible loan of used Patriot missile systems.²⁵³

3. Navy

Poland's navy, the Marynarka Wojenna (MW), is recognized as the best-managed service, with an effective staff and well-defined areas of co-operation with domestic industry. However, of the three services, it also receives the smallest share of the defense budget. The procurement budget for 2001 was insufficient to fulfill current requirements or to support future projects. Nevertheless, the force at its disposal is considerable in regional terms. It possesses three submarines, two major surface combatants and eleven other vessels capable of engaging with missiles from below the horizon. There are 2,900 men in the Maritime Border Guard who have 28 patrol craft. Almost all vessels are Russian, of Cold War vintage. The Poles have a long seagoing tradition that will ensure continued support. Most Poles still remember that the German attack on them in 1939 began with a naval bombardment from the pre-dreadnought battleship *Schleswig*

²⁵² "Air Force - Poland," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Central Europe And The Baltic States*.

²⁵³ Ibid.

Holstein, while it was supposedly making an official friendly visit to the city of Danzig-Gdansk.²⁵⁴

In line with the other forces, Navy manning levels are dropping, and are now down to a total of 13,500 personnel. 55-percent of the Navy are professional personnel, the remaining being conscripts. Currently, the Polish Navy is endeavoring to modernize its inventory with new NATO-compatible systems. To secure funding for a number of ambitious future programs, the navy is expecting to retire twenty aging vessels by 2003.²⁵⁵

The Navy is responsible for seaward defense of the coast as well as search and rescue type missions. However, on land, the army controls the Coastal Brigade. There is close cooperation in coast watching between the three armed services, and the maritime border guard. Of the three flotillas, two are designated for Coastal Defense.

Poland's navy has aspirations beyond its traditional focus on the Baltic, however, and is concentrating on active co-operation with other NATO navies including the Germans and the Danish. Aside from funding constraints, the enclosed geography of the Baltic will likely preclude the Navy from ever being a key NATO fleet. The Navy has already increased NATO capabilities in the Baltic area, providing five Lublin-class transport and mine laying vessels. However, in view of its effectiveness and experience in littoral waters, by cooperating with other Navies, it will be useful for allied operations at some point in time.²⁵⁶ In the longer term, Poland is likely to embrace Polish-Danish co-operation regarding sealift capabilities.

Poland itself plans to establish at least a single sea-assault battalion around 2010. It also plans to upgrade its capabilities in littoral waters and countermining operations by procuring the first of between ten to fourteen new Kormoran-class mine-hunters, to be built domestically in partnership with a foreign shipyard, around 2006. Additionally, Poland has a joint agreement with Turkey to modernizing its two primary naval bases - Gdynia-Oksywie and Swinoujscie. Both bases are to act as key ports for NATO ships in

²⁵⁴ Navy - Poland," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Central Europe And The Baltic States*, Jane's, February 23, 2003. Internet Site http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp?K2DocKey=%2Fcontent1%2Fjanesdata%2Fsent%2Fceursu%2Fpolas130.htm@current&Prod_Name=CEURSU&, accessed October 15, 2003.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

the eastern part of the Baltic. According to NATO obligations, all works funded primarily from the NATO Security Investment Program funds must be completed by 2005, which has helped the Navy convince government officials to approve projects quickly.²⁵⁷

Polish Naval Aviation was only formed in 1995 but has already enhanced Poland's military capability. Currently, it consists of a single brigade with seven air squadrons, a technical squadron and logistics battalions. It comprises 2,460 men with 28 combat aircraft, eleven armed helicopters, and 65 other aircraft. Of the seven squadrons of naval aviation, two are made up of fighters (MiG-21), one is made up of reconnaissance aircraft (TS-11 Iskra) and the rest are either wholly or in part rotary wing.

The Naval Aviation Brigade has so far weathered the worst cuts and still boasts around 85 aircraft. As part of a wider process of withdrawing older aircraft from service, Naval Aviation is to retire all of its MiG-21s by 2004. The Navy is trying to procure a more capable replacement. To replace rotary-wing aircraft, modernized anti-submarine warfare helicopters are being received with upgraded electronic equipment and armed with the latest torpedoes. Polish and U.S. experts have also discussed final details about the delivery of four Kaman helicopters received from the U.S. Naval Reserve for their seven frigates.²⁵⁸

F. NATO SUPPORT AND PERFORMANCE

The Poles have shown their commitment by fully supporting all of the NATO led contingencies abroad since becoming a Partnership for Peace (PfP) participant in 1993. Poland has contributed an average of 785 troops to the Kosovo Stabilization Force (KFOR). In response to NATO's April of 2000 call for additional reserve forces to support KFOR, the Poles quickly sent an additional 700 troops. This unexpected 60-day rotation ended up lasting more than five months.²⁵⁹ Poland has also consistently maintained an additional 250 troops in Bosnia as part of the Bosnian Stabilization Force (SFOR). This number has recently been increased to 450 troops.²⁶⁰ For comparison

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Joseph Ralston, "Successfully Managing NATO Enlargement," 17.

²⁶⁰ "Integrating New allies into NATO," CBO Paper, 12.

purposes, Poland is of the equivalent size as Spain, both in terms of population as well as having a similar number of military forces as was mentioned previously. With double the size of the defense budget, Spain has maintained around 960 as part of KFOR and 1350 as part of SFOR.²⁶¹ Under the circumstances, most officials have been satisfied with Poland's contribution in view of this comparison and the circumstances that surround it.

More recently, approximately 275 Polish soldiers were sent to support the U.S. led effort in Afghanistan in February 2002. Poles have been heavily involved in nearly every international involvement in the war on terrorism since.²⁶² Poland has also committed a division of 2,400 troops to the Polish-lead international peace keeping force in Iraq. While Iraq is not a NATO led operation, the North Atlantic Council has approved providing the support requested by Poland for the operation, including help with force generation, communication, logistics, and movements.²⁶³ The first soldiers of the division began arriving in Baghdad in July 2003 and are closely co-operating with the U.S. and British militaries. The U.S. Pentagon is paying two-thirds of the cost of the Polish deployment while the Polish government has agreed to pay one third.²⁶⁴ As previously discussed, recent Polish public support has been uncertain for these types of forays. Nevertheless, the current deployment of the Polish forces to Iraq is the largest Polish deployment since the Second World War. As such, Poland is showing that it is fully willing to support 'out-of-area' missions as well as the international war against terrorism.²⁶⁵

All of the recent peacekeeping and peace-enforcement deployments have provided Poland an excellent opportunity to present the capabilities of the Polish Land Forces (Wojska Ladowe; WL) to NATO. The number of Polish units assigned to NATO's various reaction forces is increasing each year. Currently, NATO strategic plans call for Poland to contribute one armored division; one mechanized division; one

²⁶¹ "Integrating New allies into NATO," CBO Paper, 12.

²⁶² "Defense, Executive Summary - Poland," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Central Europe And The Baltic States*.

²⁶³ "Plans for NATO Support to Poland's Iraq Mission Finalized," *NATO Update*, June 30, 2003. <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/06-june/e0630b.htm>, Accessed November 24, 2003.

²⁶⁴ Bradley Graham, "U.S. to Help Finance Polish Peacekeepers; Rumsfeld Assures Defense Minister of Aid in Raising Funds for Contingent in Iraq," *The Washington Post*, May 6, 2003, A Section; 13.

²⁶⁵ "Armed Forces - Poland," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Central Europe And The Baltic States*.

parachute brigade; one interoperable infantry brigade; a Search and Rescue unit; and one air combat squadron for the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). Additionally, one division is assigned to the Czech-Polish-Slovak Multinational Corps Peacekeeping Brigade. It is designed to provide a NATO-standard brigade for rapid deployment to out-of-area operations, with the aim of operational readiness by December 2005.²⁶⁶

Since becoming a member, Polish facilities have added to NATO's capacity in various ways. Poland's airspace and bases has provided NATO the reach needed for hypothetical contingencies in the Baltic Sea or in the western part of the former Soviet Union.²⁶⁷ PfP and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) deployments and exercises are often held on Polish ranges and facilities.²⁶⁸ On October 20, 2003, NATO announced plans to open a troop-training center in Poland for its rapid-reaction force within a year. This is the alliance's first major institution in a former Soviet bloc country. Polish barracks and staff will be used to support the facility.²⁶⁹

As a former Warsaw Pact member, Poland is in a unique position and has a geographical incentive to positively impact former Soviet states. It is an active mentor for other states aspiring to join NATO. In particular, the Poles are active in providing military-to-military contacts with Lithuania.²⁷⁰ Additionally, Poland has been working to encourage the Ukraine to adopt pro-western policies. According to Polish Ambassador Przemyslaw Grudzinski, Poland believes that it has a unique understanding of the challenges and trials facing former Soviet states like the Ukraine and can influence them positively.²⁷¹ U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has recently stated that Poland

²⁶⁶ Joseph Ralston, "Successfully Managing NATO Enlargement" 17.

²⁶⁷ Szayna, "NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping," 24.

²⁶⁸ "Armed Forces - Poland," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Central Europe And The Baltic States*.

²⁶⁹ Andrzej Stylinski, "NATO Training Center in Poland to start Operation Within a Year," *International News*, Associated Press, October 20, 2003.

²⁷⁰ Joseph Ralston, "Successfully Managing NATO Enlargement."

²⁷¹ Przemyslaw Grudzinski, "Case study: Results of First Round of Expansion – Poland's Experience." *NATO in The 21st Century*, U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, Vol. 7, No. 1, March 2002, 19.

will play an important role in advising the military of any new nations accepted into NATO.²⁷²

As promised when Poles achieved NATO membership, Polish officials strongly express their support for further enlargement. However, the Polish government seems most committed to seeing its neighbors, Slovakia and Lithuania join the alliance. Nevertheless, officials emphasize that they do not mean to exclude any candidates.²⁷³

G. CONCLUSION

The fact that the Polish armed forces have long been better respected and better supported by their society has been the difference that has allowed them greater funding, greater progress, and a brighter future than either of the armed forces of the Czech Republic or Hungary. Poland's positive public support also bodes well for NATO since the armed forces of Poland are more than double the size of the other two new members combined. It remains to be seen if the nostalgic traditional support Poles have provided their armed forces remains as they modernize and continue to deploy internationally as a member of NATO.

Poland further demonstrates what a tremendous challenge it is for Central European states to shed the legacy of the Warsaw Pact on their restricted military budget. While the Solidarity movement along with the influence of the Roman Catholic Church allowed Poland to Westernize their society quickly after the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, many of the problems of the Polish military in their integration into NATO are similar to the problems encountered by both the Czech Republic and Hungary. While the morale of the Polish military has remained reasonably high in the face of downsizing, the overall restructuring job is bigger in Poland because of the greater size of the military. Continued downsizing will only get harder due to high unemployment, yet, it remains necessary to modernize. In the meantime, Poland has mostly met or exceeded the 2.0-percent of GDP spending on the military goal that NATO requests from its newest members. However, a large portion of funding is being used for pensions and wages

²⁷² Gerry Gilmore, "Poland to Take Advisory Role with New NATO Members," *DefenseLINK News - Global Security.org*, September 24, 2003, Internet Site <http://globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2002/09/mil-020924-dod04b.htm>, accessed October 20, 2003.

²⁷³ "Secretariat Report," Annual Tour, Poland: July 29 - August 5, 2001.

instead of modernization. Due to the recent economic downturn and the desire to reduce debt in order to gain EU membership, it does not appear that Poland will continue to consistently meet the 2.0-percent figure. Worse still, constant turbulence and reorganization of military departments that are ultimately responsible for modernization decisions means that progress is slowed, due to the challenges of meeting multiple changing requirements at the same time.²⁷⁴

Regardless of the challenges, because of its larger defense budgets, sustained progress in accomplishing a detailed modernization plan, and strong support of NATO's missions, Poland leaves no regrets related to its acceptance into the alliance.²⁷⁵ In comparison to the other two 1999 NATO entrants, nobody questions Polish commitment or is questioning the wisdom of future expansion based on the Polish experience. However, Despite the Poles' enthusiasm and deep commitment, the Central European region will not significantly enhance NATO's military might any time soon. But given its location, Central and Eastern Europe could and should play a positive role in pushing the frontiers of stability eastward, most essentially towards the Ukraine.²⁷⁶

²⁷⁴ Christopher Bobinske, "Poland: NATO Membership is a Tough Test," *The Financial Times Limited*, London, England, April 17, 2000, 3.

²⁷⁵ "Integrating New allies into NATO," *CBO Paper*, x.

²⁷⁶ Charles Gati, All That NATO Can Be: To Prague and Beyond, *The National Interest*, Summer 2002, 7. Internet Site <http://store.yahoo.com/expandnato/gatinato.html>, accessed October 22, 2003.

V. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

All of Europe's democracies, from the Baltics to the Black Sea and all that lie between, should have the same chance for security and freedom – and the same chance to join the institutions of Europe – as Europe's old democracy's have.

George W. Bush, Warsaw, June 15, 2001

The primary purpose of this thesis has been to determine certain insights for policymakers from the experience of the 1999 NATO accessants in their pursuit of alliance integration that might be of benefit to the new round of aspirants, expected to achieve membership in May of 2004. A second purpose has been to determine what can be done to mitigate similar challenges that the newest round of alliance members might encounter.

A. DIFFERENCES IN ENLARGEMENT BETWEEN 1999 AND 2004

Since the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined NATO almost five years ago, the geo-strategic circumstances will be different for the 2004 accessants to be sure. As such, any comparison needs to be kept in context for several reasons. First, the Membership Action Plan (MAP) has evolved into a much more comprehensive policy than the so-called "Perry Principles" that made up the criteria under which the 1999 accessants joined the alliance. Since it was passed April 24, 1999, MAP's nine pages of detailed standards provided a roadmap, which makes meeting the criteria for membership more transparent for the aspirants. MAP should give greater certainty to what was previously an evolving standard.

Second, circumstances will be different for each of the 2004 aspirants because, as we have learned from the case studies, the unique historical circumstances of each matters. The case studies of the first round entrants show that the history of each has affected both their political and economic success, as well as being a root cause of their failures. The unique history of each has affected their civil-military affairs well as their ability to integrate into NATO. While there are significant similarities between the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, noting that each was part of the Warsaw Pact and

under Soviet domination, each has unique differences of state and society. For instance, the societal status of those who serve in the military seems to be much higher in Poland than in the Czech Republic or Hungary. This factor alone has proved significant for Poland's greater success of integrating into the alliance.

Finally, it should be noted that, via PfP, the militaries of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia have been operating as part of NATO missions in the Balkans and elsewhere as long as have the Czechs, Hungarians, and Polish. Therefore, in view of the additional time that they have had to work with NATO prior to becoming candidates for membership, one might expect that the 2004 NATO aspirants would have a less difficult time integrating their militaries with NATO, all other things being equal.

B. LESSONS LEARNED

Tremendous patience by NATO officials regarding the pace of integration will be required for the new NATO members. While the case studies show that each of the 1999 accessants appear to have consolidated their democracy, established a stable civil society and market economy, and developed appropriate civil-military relations, the slow pace of economic prosperity has contributed to low funding for the armed forces. As such, modernization and integration into NATO is moving slowly. Additionally, much of the defense budgets are still being used to fund residual salary and pensions left over from the larger cold war militaries. This factor also exacerbates the slow pace of modernization. While the rapid reduction of forces is helping reduce this drag on the modernization of the military, it remains a significant factor. However, the effect of residual personnel costs will not be a factor in all of the 2004 aspirant militaries. Those that were independent states or part of independent states prior to the breakup of the Warsaw Pact -- Bulgaria, Romania, and to some extent, Slovakia -- have pre-existing militaries and, therefore, are dealing with legacy personnel costs. The remaining states -- Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia -- did not have independent Warsaw Pact war militaries and will not have as severe a burden.²⁷⁷ Obviously, this later group will be able

²⁷⁷Joseph Ralston in, "Successfully Managing NATO Enlargement," *NATO in the 21st Century – The Road Ahead*, U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State, Vol. 7, No. 1, March 2002, 18-19.

to put a greater percentage of their funding allocation into modernization, all things being equal. Nevertheless, because they are starting with little, they also have a significant burden.

In addition to patience, NATO officials can fairly assume that the new aspirants are exaggerating their capabilities and commitments and should plan accordingly. As we have seen during the last round of enlargement, many of the capabilities and commitments of the 1999 accessants still remain unfulfilled. Officials can expect that, as the new round of PfP militaries are reduced and restructured over the next decade, human and financial resources will be stretched beyond capacity. This was certainly the experience in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. As evidence, in June of 2000, Hungarian Defense Minister Gyöergy Keleti said bluntly that, "... in order for Hungary to achieve NATO membership, it made commitments it was not prepared to keep."²⁷⁸ The MAP partners who are expected to gain NATO membership in 2004 will, no doubt, be exaggerating defense planning and force capabilities to accommodate their political and security objectives in a similar way. After membership is achieved, unless an unforeseen threat emerges, priorities will likely change away from NATO's concerns. The focus of the populations in the aspirant states is likely to be on societal goals other than military security. NATO membership may create some social tensions because of the competing interests within these societies.²⁷⁹ The degree of exaggeration by the aspirants may be mitigated by the fact that PfP missions and the formalized MAP process will create a greater awareness of their true commitment and capabilities prior to membership.

Related to the issue of the ability of member states to fulfill commitments, a review of the 1999 accessants shows that it is ultimately the taxpayers in the candidate countries that need to make good on the commitments NATO membership brings. As in the Czech case, when taxpayers are neither involved in the decision to join NATO, nor

²⁷⁸ Wallander, "NATO's Price – Shape Up or Ship Out," *Foreign Affairs*, December 1, 2002.

²⁷⁹ The authors thoughts on this subject were influenced by reading the article by Jeffrey Simon entitled "Transforming the Armed Forces of Central and East Europe," *Strategic Forum*, No. 172, June 2000, 1.

informed about the costs of accession, it becomes difficult for the new member state to meet their commitments.²⁸⁰

Another significant lesson from the previous round of members is the tremendous burden the Air Force is likely to place on the ability of the current aspirants to modernize. The insistence of each 1999 accessant to have its own independent Air Force has created a significant drain on the resources available for any other type of military modernization projects. In the cases of the Czech Republic and Hungary, the majority of funds earmarked for modernization are allocated to modernizing the Air Force. The Air Force is also a major drain on the funding in Poland. All the while NATO officials have discouraged both the Czechs and the Hungarians from investing in fighter aircraft at the expense of more pressing modernization projects. Instead of heeding this advice, the Czechs and Hungarians are procuring less expensive types of aircraft for acquisition – types that are not particularly useful to NATO. It is difficult to support the wisdom of this decision on strategic grounds alone. Because of the ‘economies of scale’ required for small, economically strapped states to maintain modern fighter aircraft, many of the current NATO aspirants are struggling with similar questions.²⁸¹

In response to the problems associated with the desire of former-communist states to maintain independent air forces, there is a need for a more thorough debate on such procurement issues in general. For many of the Central and Eastern European states, it may well make more sense to allocate resources to ground-based air defenses, airspace monitoring systems and developing base infrastructure for the forward deployment of aircraft from larger Allies. An alternative approach might involve the development of genuinely multinational squadrons of fighter aircraft designated to provide air defense. Professor Pal Dunáy and others have suggested that a shared Air Force between a group of Central European states under the NATO and EU umbrella might provide better economies of scale and help these states support a more potent Air Force.²⁸² The states of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have already established the Central

²⁸⁰ The opinions expressed in this paragraph seem to be shared by Gabal, Helsusova, and Szayna in “The Impact of NATO Membership in the Czech Republic: Changing Czech Views of Security, Military, and Defense,” 56.

²⁸¹ Barany, *The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies*, 87-88, 171, 215.

²⁸² Andrew Cottee, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Foster, “Military Matters: Beyond Prague,” *NATO Review*, NATO, Autumn 2002, 4, Internet site <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue3/english/military.html>, accessed September 25, 2003.

European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) among themselves to help merge their economies.²⁸³ Perhaps a parallel agreement could be developed to merge the fighter aircraft assets in these same states by developing a parallel agreement. Perhaps a similar agreement could be signed between the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and another one between the Balkan states (Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia). In this way, all of the former communist states joining NATO could support some portion of their desire for air sovereignty while achieving a force multiplier. In addition they will achieve greater 'economies of scale' and save funding for other modernization projects.

In spite of the many ways that militaries of Central Europe might be able to operate more efficiently, the case studies show that, once being granted the security of becoming alliance members, there is reluctance by the 1999 accessants to appropriately fund their militaries. This problem is obvious in Hungary as well as in the Czech Republic, and appears to be developing in Poland to some extent. One can expect to see the same tendency to emerge in the new NATO aspirants. In spite of the many other competing priorities in these states, NATO membership provides all of these fairly small states a significant security guarantee at a discounted price. This guarantee is outlined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949, which states that "...an armed attack against one or more [members]...in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against all..." and that they can expect the assistance necessary from the other members of the alliance.²⁸⁴ The case studies seem to indicate that most of the funding problems are not due to an inadequate funding request from the various Ministries of Defense. Rather, the lack of funding for the military is due to the state of civil-military relations, causing an inability to obtain approval for the amount of military appropriations requested. As retired U.S. Lieutenant General Daniel Schroeder pointed out during his review of the Czech reform plans, the armed forces of the NATO aspirants must "market" themselves by promoting the importance of the military, both internally and externally. It may be that the armed forces of the former Warsaw Pact are politically

²⁸³ The Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) was established following the Visegrad Declaration of February 1991. The Free Trade Agreement was signing in Krakow on 21 December 1992 by Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, and became effective on 1 March 1993. This information comes from "Wikipedia – The Free Encyclopedia," Internet site http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visegard_Agreement , accessed November 14, 2003.

²⁸⁴ "The North Atlantic Treaty," *NATO Handbook* , (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), 528.

uncomfortable with this concept. However, all of the new NATO entrants and aspirants lack an effective defense lobby as was noted in the Hungarian case study.²⁸⁵ As such, this need to “market” the military in society is a capability that the new NATO aspirants need to develop if they hope to build esteem for the military as well as procure the funding they require.

While additional funding is needed for the military, the castigation of new members by NATO officials for the lack of their GDP devoted to their armed forces is somewhat unfair. Outside of the United States, the commitment has receded among most NATO members. As previously noted, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary are ranked 6th, 8th, and 11th out of the nineteen NATO members in terms of the percentage of GDP they appropriate to their militaries.²⁸⁶ From this perspective, none of them are “free riders” as they are sometimes accused. All three have demonstrated the will to support their national defense to the degree of other European states. However, the inability of the 1999 accessants to live up to their promises mentioned previously, as well as the small capacity of their economies means that defense budgets will remain inadequate for NATO integration to take place very quickly. Indeed, the 1999 members have not always followed the advice of NATO officials regarding the best use of their appropriations to support integration. This can also be seen in the case studies, particularly in the areas dealing with the Air Force. Certainly, it can be expected that the same types of issues may arise from time to time with the current NATO aspirants.

C. THE EXPANSION DEBATE

During the 1990s, political opponents and doubters to NATO expansion were both distinguished and passionate. A few of the more vocal critics included statesmen George Kennan and Henry Kissinger; Historian John Lewis Gaddis; Senators John Warner, Kay Hutchinson, and Ted Stevens; and New York Times columnist Tom

²⁸⁵ According to Professor Donald Abenheim of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA, who specialized in issues related to NATO enlargement, of the NATO members, only the United States has an effective defense lobby that helps market the needs of its armed forces. Other NATO members do not have this support. This matter was discussed by Professor Abenheim with the author on November 3, 2003.

²⁸⁶ Joseph Ralston in, “Successfully Managing NATO Enlargement,” *NATO in the 21st Century – The Road Ahead*, U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State, Vol. 7, No. 1, March 2002, 17.

Friedman.²⁸⁷ Numerous academics opposed the expansion of NATO as well. Many were concerned about provoking the Russians. Most were concerned about the expense associated with expansion in comparison to the benefits. Others were focused on the fact that NATO was a military alliance and that pursuits like promoting democracy, promotion of free markets, and controlling nuclear non-proliferation are outside the alliance charter.²⁸⁸ These critics believed that NATO should concentrate on its military capability. Still others were concerned that more members would cause gridlock in NATO's decision making process. Since the 1999 round of enlargement, overt criticism of expansion has almost entirely subsided. The experience with the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland has been positive enough to limit criticism aimed at future expansion in principle. Today, very few critics of NATO enlargement remain.

Based on the case studies, it is clear that all of the 1999 accessants have made contributions to the alliance, in the Balkans and elsewhere. However, their operational value is limited. They are currently "bit players" in NATO's strategic plans, but are slowly taking on greater roles. It is clear that they are all slowly moving on the right path, not only in terms of the redesign of their military, but in terms of the health of their democracy and market economy. The fact that Central Europe has been stable and peaceful bodes well for future expansion.

In spite of their successes, there is still some controversy over the 'cost of enlargement' debate, partially because the cost is proving difficult to quantify. Back in 1997, estimates from the Congressional Budget Office, RAND, the Department of Defense and elsewhere to bring the 1999 accessants into the alliance ranged from \$10-billion to an astronomical \$100-billion depending on which criteria was used.²⁸⁹ Currently, NATO estimates that the total cost of enlargement of NATO for the three 1999 accessants will only cost around \$1.5-billion over ten years, most of which will be used to fund infrastructure improvements in these countries. The cost to the U.S. is approximately 25-percent of this figure, or \$400 million over ten years. Additionally, the Congressional Budget Office now reports that the addition of the Czech Republic,

²⁸⁷ Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door: The Agenda Ahead*, 252, 259, 266-267.

²⁸⁸ See "NATO Expansion and the Problem of a NATO Strategy," *Global Intelligence Update: Red Alert*, GlobalBeat, March 15, 1999, <http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/nato/GIU031599.html> [accessed 7/23/2003].

²⁸⁹ Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door: The Agenda Ahead*, 271.

Hungary, and Poland to the alliance has reduced the U.S. share of the NATO civil budget from 23.3-percent to 22.5-percent, and the military budget from 28.0-percent to 26.2-percent. The U.S. share of the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) budget fell from 28.3-percent to 25.2-percent.²⁹⁰ While there is still a net cost to the U.S. for expansion, the offset described must be considered when assessing the cost of expansion.

Based on the experience of the 1999 accessants, there is still some criticism that persists regarding what the pace of future enlargement should be. The critics of hasty future expansion include Senator John Warner and Professor Zoltan Barany of the University of Texas, among others.²⁹¹ Their arguments are based on the premise that NATO remains primarily a military alliance with military contribution being the largest factor. Professor Barany articulates this perspective in his 2003 book, *The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies*. Barany sees the Czech Republic and Hungary as “free riders.” He feels that “...both the Czech Republic and Hungary have been less than eager contributors to European security since becoming NATO members.” He feels that this attitude shows up as both a lack of enthusiasm, as well as in their budget allocations. He notes that, “...before joining, political elites in both states were quick to promise the kinds of military reforms that Brussels required. Once they became members, however, their incentives to deliver on those promises had largely disappeared, in large part because NATO does not have an expulsion mechanism in place.” Because of this, Barney and others believe that it is imperative that states aspiring to NATO membership actually fulfill all stated requirements involved in the MAP before being invited “into the tent.”²⁹² Others, including the author of this thesis, believe that the 2004 aspirants can be brought along much faster militarily once they are already ‘inside the tent.’ Additionally, it should be noted that it is doubtful long-standing members could be said to have fulfilled all of the MAP criteria, even now. NATO integration has always been an evolving process for all of its members, regardless of their membership tenure.

²⁹⁰ Joseph Ralston in, “Successfully Managing NATO Enlargement,” *NATO in the 21st Century – The Road Ahead*, U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State, Vol. 7, No. 1, March 2002, 18.

²⁹¹ John W. Warner, “NATO Enlargement: We Must Carefully Review and Study the Ramifications,” *NATO in the 21st Century – The Road Ahead*, U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State, Vol. 7, No. 1, March 2002, 23-24; and Barney, *The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies*, 3

²⁹² Barany, *The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies*, 3.

Perhaps a solution to Professor Barany's concerns regarding the experience of the 1999 round of enlargement could be addressed in a manner articulated by Professor Charles Gati of John Hopkins University. Gati feels that the second round of enlargement could be articulated to be the beginning of NATO's recovery. In 2002, Gati stated that:

“Under the circumstances, the second round of enlargement could be -- and should be -- the beginning of a process to redefine NATO's mission. The new NATO will not be the NATO of the Cold War, and it ought not be the NATO that could not find its place after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It should be a NATO whose primary mission is to maintain and expand the zone of political stability from the Atlantic to the Urals.”²⁹³

Gati well articulates what appears to already be the ‘real’ agenda of NATO. Perhaps the remaining critics to the new round of expansion could be answered by formally articulating this new mission in NATO's charter, as Gati seems to be suggesting.

D. BURDEN SHARING

Perhaps the lack of enthusiasm and budget shortfalls Barany points to as shortcoming of the newest members of the alliance are not isolated to those members at all. Based on the fact that there are numerous nations in the alliance spending a smaller percentage of their GDP on defense than the 1999 accessants, perhaps Barany and others should be focused on the broader issue of “burden sharing” in general. On a grander scale, “easy rider” and “free rider” charges against the 1999 accessants might really be just a facet of the burden-sharing problem. The claims of inequitable burden sharing have been a concern of many NATO members almost from the beginning. It is clear that these claims are not going to go away without a commitment by all the alliance members to solving the problem once and for all. Many feel that NATO's reported ‘fracturing’ or ‘uncoupling’ could be partially the result of the resentment over inequitable burden sharing.²⁹⁴

²⁹³ Charles Gati, “All That NATO Can Be: To Prague and Beyond,” *The National Interest*, Summer 2002, 6 . Internet Site <http://store.yahoo.com/expandnato/gatinato.html>, accessed October 22, 2003.

²⁹⁴ There are numerous predictions, many of them dire, over the future of the transatlantic alliance. Just one of these perspectives can be found within a recent essay by Robert Kagan entitled, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, (New York: Random House, 2003).

In many ways, the feeling of citizens in the 1999 accessant states is typical of many Europeans after the fall of communism. Now that they are oriented to the West and surrounded by democratic neighbors that are also oriented to the West, they are unable to see a security threat that involves the military. They see few purposes for their military, and do not seem to feel an overwhelming commitment to the transatlantic alliance that insures their security. Social concerns are their priority. And from a state-centric point of view the European public may well be correct – there are no imminent identifiable security threats to Europe involving the military for the foreseeable future. However, from a more strategic point of view, the Europeans are only in this enviable position because of the stability fostered by NATO over the long term. And only by all of the members (including the new accessants) living up to the commitment, will the alliance continue to serve their security needs at a very reasonable cost to the member states.

In her 2002 article *NATO's Price – Shape Up or Ship Out*, Celeste Wallander, Director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, expresses the belief of many when she notes that NATO is hampered because many of its members do not live up to the standards of the alliance. More than just burden sharing, she believes these commitments include protecting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in member countries. She notes that, once an aspirant state becomes a member, NATO currently loses all leverage to induce its members to live up to its membership requirements. Wallander surmises that NATO has created a “moral problem” among its members. She notes that this term is often used in financial circles to mean “...a condition in which one does not have to pay the price for risk-taking or rule breaking behavior.” In an equivalent way, she notes that membership without enforceable conditions actually create incentives for delinquency in the alliance.²⁹⁵

At this point, it is important to keep in mind the positive role NATO has played in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. As an organization that is now engaged in encouraging new democracies and developing market economies, NATO has already proven a success in each case. However, because the 1999 accessants (as well as other members) have now achieved full membership status, NATO has no way to discipline

²⁹⁵ Wallander, “NATO’s Price – Shape Up or Ship Out,” *Foreign Affairs*, December 1, 2002.

those members if they quit following the rules. As such, any incentive for members to uphold the alliance standards has been lost. Yet, only through the persistence of common values can NATO be effective. The only way for common values to be maintained is for NATO to have the ability to discipline delinquent members. The ability of NATO to issue sanctions or the expulsion of members would give the Ministry of Defense and others in each member country the leverage they need to solicit better support from their government in order to meet their collective defense commitments.²⁹⁶ Until this takes place, the public and politicians in member countries will continue to make the “moral hazard calculation” Wallander describes, and there will be little incentive for them to support their defense obligations.²⁹⁷ While Wallander’s proposal is excellent, politically, it is probably not feasible. It is difficult to see circumstances that might cause a consensus of alliance members to agree to such a proposal any time soon.

E. THE RECORD OF ENLARGEMENT SO FAR

While the alliance continues to have challenges like burden-sharing just as it always has, the record of enlargement is generally a success based on the case studies. Contrary to many forecasts, the Balkan wars have not spread to Central or Eastern Europe. One reason for this positive non-event is that NATO’s new and old members have understood their responsibilities to the extent necessary and have acted accordingly. Not only the new members but the new aspirants, too, have contributed to the difficult stability emerging in the Balkans. In contrast to the pre-NATO 20th century period, historical and ethnic disagreements, such as those between Hungary and Romania, have produced no wars or notable skirmishes. One reason has been that NATO aspirants do not want to spoil their prospects for membership. Without that societal goal, nationalist leaders would emerge as they always have and would feel free to exploit these issues for domestic political purposes. In spite of the challenges, NATO continues to be effective because it continues to create non-events, like the hypothetical ones described, at an extremely reasonable cost. All signs indicate that the process of NATO expansion will

²⁹⁶ Note: Charles Gati, Zoltan Barany and many others have also written about the need for NATO to be able to sanction members. However, Wallander appears to have developed the tenets of a sanctions program for non-complying members to a greater degree than others.

²⁹⁷ Wallander, “NATO’s Price – Shape Up or Ship Out,” *Foreign Affairs*, December 1, 2002.

continue to maximize the chances that Central and Eastern Europe will continue, for the first time in its history, to become a region of stable democracies and free markets that are cooperative with other Western governments. From the current vantage point, who can criticize the role that NATO enlargement has played to create a better Europe?


ADDITIONAL TABLES

Table 5. Regional Military Balance²⁹⁸

Country	Armed Forces Strength	Armored Vehicles	Combat Aircraft ⁽¹⁾	Major Naval Vessels ⁽²⁾	Defense Budget US\$ million (2002)
Bulgaria	66,500	N/A	N/A	N/A	859
Czech Republic	40,300	2,289	110	None	1,211
Estonia	5,083	39	None	1	109
Hungary	35,300	1,790	70	None	925 ⁽³⁾
Latvia	3,400	15	None	None	144
Lithuania	10,874	105	6	2	200 ⁽⁴⁾
Poland	214,900	4,583	292	14	3,052
Romania	152,600	N/A	N/A	N/A	980
Slovakia	35,000	1,452	109	None	387 ⁽⁶⁾
Slovenia	9,320	N/A	None	N/A	299
Note <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Combat Aircraft comprises fixed-wing aircraft capable either of aerial combat or ground attack. 2. Major Naval Vessels comprises those with OH (over-the-horizon capability). This definition includes PFM (Patrol, Fast Missile craft), a class which often embraces corvettes 3. Figure from 1999. 4. Estimated Figure (2001). 5. Projected Figure (2002). 6. Figure from 2001 <p>Note: Those in 'Bold' are the 1999 NATO Accessants. Others are 2004 NATO Aspirants.</p>					

²⁹⁸ The information in this chart was compiled from "Regional Military Balance Charts" from *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment*, Internet Site www.janes.com, accessed September 29, 2003. The defense budget was updated, except where noted, with 2002 information taken from "Facts on International Relations and Security Trends (FIRST)" <http://first.sipri.org/index.php>, accessed November 23, 2003.

Table 6. European Allies' Defense Spending as a Percentage of GDP, 1993-2000²⁹⁹



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Institute for National Strategic Studies and NATO.


Table 7. Spending for the 1999 NATO Accessants as a percentage of GDP

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Poland	2.2	2.1	2.0	1.9	1.89	1.95	1.95(est.)
Hungary	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.51	1.6	1.6	--
Czech Republic	1.6	1.8	2.0	2.0	2.0	--	1.9(est.)

SOURCE: "Facts on International Relations and Security Trends (FIRST)," <http://first.sipri.org/index/php>, accessed November 23, 2003.

²⁹⁹ Integrating New allies into NATO," *CBO Paper*, ix.

Table 8. Central European Allies' Historical and Projected Defense Spending, 1997-2003
(In billions of 1999 U.S. dollars)³⁰⁰



SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from NATO, the Congressional Research Service, the embassies of Hungary and the Czech Republic, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Economist Intelligence Unit, and the U.S. Department of Defense.

³⁰⁰ Integrating New allies into NATO," *CBO Paper*, 8.

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